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MILITARY ROADS FOR WAR AND PEACE—1791-1836

BY HAROLD L. NELSON

A WELTER of problems pressed upon the United States military establishment as the nation struggled for permanence in its earliest years. An index to the exigencies is in some of the first official Army reports: Building and reorganizing forces, training officers, organizing a state militia program, making treaties with Indians, investigating failures of frontier generals, and keeping enlistments up and desertions down, left little time to work out some lesser, but highly important, problems.¹ One of the latter was roads—roads on which to move troops and equipment to engage potential enemies, Indian or British.

A chronic apprehension over the position of the British in Canada and in the Ohio country pervaded official and civilian thought in the United States following the Revolutionary War. Despite the Treaty of 1783, England clung for more than a decade to posts in the Ohio country. In the late 1780's, Canadian agents worked to unite the Northwest Indians in the hope that England could "not only keep out American settlers but perhaps bludgeon the United States into relinquishing the whole region to the red men as a buffer state under English protection."² This agitation helped bring about the Indian wars that were not won until 1794, by General Anthony Wayne. Abandonment of the Northwest posts by the British came finally with Jay's Treaty in 1794, but for decades to follow, the belief in England as a possible aggressor on the northern border frightened territorial governors, settlers, soldiers, and

congressmen.³

The lack of roads into the Northwest contributed considerably to the disasters met by Generals Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair in 1790 and 1791, when they campaigned against the Indians in the high Miami, Wabash, and Maumee River areas (A on the map on the following page shows St. Clair's route^{3a}). But General Wayne's preparations against the same Indians in 1794 included cutting a road from Fort Washington on the Ohio River, far to the north (B). When his battle-advance took place, the first leg of the road was ready, and his troops were experienced in road-building.

... Wayne's campaign is most interesting from the standpoint of road-building. It was Wayne's advance which awed the savages, not the battle of Fallen Timber. The army crashed northward through the forests as though ever in pursuit of a foe.

... the record of no pioneer army in America equals the marching records of Wayne's legion.⁴

The Indians named Wayne "The Whirlwind" because of his marching speed.

The War Department recognized a need for frontier roads, and provided, in Indian treaties of the early 1800's, for passage for settlers or for road construction.⁵ Yet it did not press for construction. Its inactivity was due partly to its many pressing problems, but

³19th Cong., 1st Sess., *House Report* 42, Ser. 141, pp. 1 ff. The nation's concern over safety of its borders focused on the north and northwest areas. Although flanked to the south and southwest by Spain, the United States felt virtually no fear of that country, which in 1796 had only 1,386 effectives guarding its border from Florida to New Orleans to the mouth of the Missouri. A. P. Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question* (New York, 1934), p. 51.


^{3a}The maps accompanying this article were prepared by R. D. Evans, a cartographer, from sketches by the author.

⁴A. B. Hulbert, *Historic Highways of America* (Cleveland, 1904), VII, 200, 217-18.

⁵See especially Treaty of Brownstown (1808), *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 757. (Hereafter designated *ASPIA*.) Also *ibid.*, pp. 562, 651, 658, 698.

¹*American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, 20-152, contains report after report revealing the complexity and variety of problems. (Hereafter designated *ASPM*.)

²R. A. Billington, *Westward Expansion* (New York, 1949), p. 222.



R. D. EVANS

also to the conflict over constitutionality of the government's appropriating money for, or engaging in, road-building. The Constitution said that post roads could be built, but was silent about military and general roads. Military committees in Congress cast doubts in 1806 and 1807. A House committee rejected a proposal that it purchase a collection of draughts, plans, models, and instruments,

as the basis for a "department of works and public economy," saying:

Doubts also have been suggested respecting the powers of the General Government to contribute to any actual improvement of the means of internal intercourse, unless requested by the individual States, or confined to the existing roads. . . .⁶

⁶American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I, 456-57, 463. (Hereafter designated ASPM.)

The conflict over constitutional powers to build military roads was not to be resolved for almost 20 years.

MILITARY ROADS THROUGH THE WAR OF 1812

The first military roads built by the young nation appear to have been those cut through the woods and bogs of the present states of Ohio and Indiana by Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne in the Indian wars of the early 1790's. These were wartime roads constructed by troops to effect battle. As time went on, what constituted a military road was not so clear. Civilians considered almost any government road a "military road," it seems, for Army Engineers supervised virtually all road-building by the government, and many roads were paid for by appropriations in control of the War Department.⁷ Roads built by the troops, for whatever purpose, deserve the name "military roads"; also those built specifically for military purposes by civilian contractors who were supervised by Army Engineers or officers of the Quartermaster Corps. The latter two types will be considered herein.

The exact extent of military road-building between Wayne's marches and the War of 1812 is not clear. Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup, in a report in 1831 on the roads that had "at any time been constructed by the army," listed none prior to 1817. He said that before and during the War of 1812 some had been built, but since no data were available concerning them, he did not list them.⁸

The famous Natchez Trace, from Nashville, Tennessee, to Natchez, Mississippi, re-

ceived early attention from the Army. The road afforded poor passage for travelers and mail, and, in 1801, treaties with the Chickasaws and Choctaws provided for road construction by the United States along this route.⁹ Troops of the second regiment of infantry began work in October, 1801, near the Tennessee River, and by the summer of 1802 had almost completed their work.¹⁰ It is not clear how far south they worked, or how much of their effort was re-routing and how much rebuilding.

Faced with strong demands from the West for a link between the transmontane frontier and the East, Congress agreed in 1806 to appropriate money for a general road—the renowned Cumberland Road from Cumberland, Maryland, to Wheeling, West Virginia. The same year, Congress passed "an act to . . . authorize the laying out certain public roads," and here the troops became involved. Of three roads authorized, one, requested by the Postmaster General, was built by the troops. It ran from the Georgia frontier—the Ocmulgee River, at Fort Hawkins—to Fort Stoddert at the head of Mobile Bay (C). The troops did not finish the work until early 1812, after another appropriation from Congress in 1809.¹¹ There is evidence that the troops also worked on an extension of this post road, approved for construction to New Orleans in 1807 by Congress, with the provision that details be worked out with Spain.

Growing tension with Britain led Congress in 1811 to appropriate \$6,000 for roads south and west from Lower Sandusky, Ohio, as provided by the Brownstown Treaty of

⁷Road-building laws passed by Congress and subsequent annual reports of the War Department (Chief Engineer and Quartermaster General sections) show the Army's universal participation.

⁸ASPMA, IV, 625. Jesup served as Quartermaster General for 42 years, from 1818 to 1860. Fred C. Hagen, "The Story of the Quartermaster Corps, 1775-1927," *Quartermaster Review*, Sept.-Oct. 1927, p. 35.

⁹ASPIA, I, 653; R. S. Cotterill, "The Natchez Trace," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, VII (April 1921), 34.

¹⁰J. P. Bretz, "Early Land Communication with the Lower Mississippi Valley," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XII (June 1926), 7-8.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 16; *Niles Register*, I (Jan. 18, 1812), 376.

1808.¹² These were to penetrate the almost impassable "Black Swamp" lying west of Lake Erie; the isolated Michigan Territory, highly vulnerable to attack from Canada, thus was to become more accessible. It was two years until the plan was partially carried out, during the War of 1812.

When the war came, the lack of roads over the planned routes was disastrous. The first Northwest campaign in the war, led by General William Hull, was ordered to lay siege to Canada's Fort Malden, across the strait from Detroit. Hull believed the plan precarious, for as governor of Michigan Territory he knew well the impossibility of passage and supply for an army in the swamps that lay between his force on the Ohio River and Detroit. But with war still undeclared, his militia and regulars reached the present Urbana, Ohio, and began cutting a road north (D). They moved with fair speed except when the rains rendered the ground "almost impassable for wagons. . . . The mud was deep, and from every appearance the whole Army was likely to stick in the swamps."¹³ Embarrassed seriously by the government's failure to inform him that war had been declared until too late to prevent a minor disaster, he nevertheless invaded Canada briefly. But apprehensive of the whole campaign, he fell back to Detroit where he surrendered to a British attack after the enemy had cut off what tenuous supply lines he had. Michigan Territory fell to the British. A House committee reported later that if good roads had existed in the area during Hull's campaign, ". . . this nation would have been spared the humiliation of witnessing a disgraceful capitulation. . . ."¹⁴

In late 1812, General William Henry Har-

rison gathered a new force in central Ohio. By October he found he could not penetrate the Black Swamp. His letters show frustration at the incredible difficulties of locomotion. Two trips from headquarters to the nearest supply dump forward, he said, ruined a team of horses. "To get supplies forward, through a swampy wilderness of nearly 200 miles in wagons or on packhorses . . . is absolutely impossible," he wrote. The enormous cost of transporting supplies made it necessary for him to have at his command practically unlimited funds.¹⁵ "You can scarcely form an idea, sir," he wrote, "of the difficulty with which transportation is effected. . . . The country . . . is almost a continued swamp to the lakes."¹⁶

The prodigious hardships forced upon Harrison's troops because there were no roads was reflected in report after report of committees, Army men, and governors in years following. Harrison's troubles during the winter of 1812-1813 went a long way toward making up the \$60,000,000 expenditure estimated as the cost of transporting American troops and supplies during the War of 1812—a huge figure for service of supply for the times.¹⁷

Included in this great sum of money was the \$6,000 Congressional appropriation of 1811 for roads over the Black Swamp. It was used in building a 30-mile road from Lower Sandusky, Ohio, to Fort Meigs at the Rapids of the Maumee River (E). The nature of the terrain was described eight years later, when the House committee reporting on Hull's disaster said the road was now virtually obliterated by the encroaching swamp.¹⁸

¹⁵McAfee, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-13.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 186. See also Marguerite M. McKee, "Service of Supply in the War of 1812," *Quartermaster Review*, May-June 1927, pp. 27, 29, 34.

¹⁷Balthasar H. Meyer, *Transportation in the United States Before 1860* (Washington, 1917), p. 91.

¹⁸ASPM, II, 593, 595; McAfee, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

¹²See n. 5, *supra*.

¹³Robert B. McAfee, *History of the Late War in the Western Country* (Bowling Green, O., 1816, 1819), p. 66.

¹⁴ASPM, II, 595.

Harrison managed to build enough make-shift roads and trails through the area in which his armies were camped, to assure a successful movement northward to attack the British. His force was so superior to the British and Indians that he easily won the Battle of the Thames in Ontario on October 5, 1813, and regained Michigan Territory as a result. The exhausting work of building supply and marching lines in a marsh was finished before he attacked; the roads and trails gave him assurance that the rear was safe and sent him into battle well equipped.

To the east, the Niagara campaign was complicated by road difficulties less serious. In the St. Lawrence campaign, General James Wilkinson's feeble assault in 1814 on the British at La Colle Mill, north of Champlain, New York, was slowed by wet, obstructed roads, and his failure (which later led to a court martial) is in part attributed to the fact that he could not haul heavy artillery through the mud in order to batter the walls of the Mill.¹⁹ Later, in peacetime, the President ordered construction of a military road in this area, and the Army harked back to "embarrassments" caused here by lack of roads.

Nor were General Andrew Jackson's problems of movement in the southern theater of the proportion of Harrison's.

There was nothing so infelicitous as the failure of General Hull to receive prompt advice of the declaration of war by his own country, but it is hardly necessary to state that difficult communication with the southern frontier had seriously embarrassed the work of war.²⁰

One road built by Jackson was a short link between the Tennessee and Coosa Rivers in northeastern Alabama (F).²¹ To his rear, as he descended on the Creek villages in 1813,

the road was actually a portage route for supplies moved up or down the Tennessee.

When the war ended in 1814, it must have been evident to the Army that neglect of road-building in peacetime was suicidal in war. The bogs of Ohio had swallowed millions of dollars in lost equipment, time, and effort; had meant the sacrifice of many lives and of battles; and had been responsible in large measure for the temporary loss of Michigan Territory.

No peacetime policy of military road construction had been formulated beyond that which would fill the immediate demands of posts and forts, and beyond occasional work on post roads. A change from indifference was to come quickly. It seems clear that extreme situations, arising from the helplessness of armies that could not move during the War of 1812, were in large part responsible for the change.

EMERGENCE OF A MILITARY ROAD POLICY

The change was evidenced first in the attitude of the Executive. Secretary of War William H. Crawford explained President Madison's position on military roads to General Andrew Jackson in a letter of March 8, 1816, little more than a year after the War of 1812 ended:

The employment of the troops in opening military roads . . . has been determined upon by the President, after due deliberation. It is believed to be no less necessary to the discipline, health and preservation of the troops, than useful to the public interest.²²

Jackson had recommended a new road from central Tennessee to New Orleans; it would cut some 300 miles from the old Natchez Trace, he said, and was highly important to the defense of the deep South and New Orleans. Madison approved, and Congress provided funds on April 27, 1816.²³

¹⁹H. M. Brackenridge, *History of the Late War* (Philadelphia, 1839), p. 198; J. Hannay, *History of the War of 1812* (Toronto, 1905), p. 248.

²⁰Bretz, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

²¹Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

²²J. S. Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* (Washington, 1927), II, 223.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 235; *ASPM*, II, 468; *U. S. Laws*, VI, Ch. 112, p. 113.

Thus came the first recognition of the need to correct a weakness that led to tragedy in the War of 1812. "Jackson's Military Road," as it has been known since, was begun in 1817 and was finished in 1820 (G).²⁴

Crawford's letter to Jackson was followed by another in May, to Major General A. Macomb in Michigan Territory. It implemented another Presidential order, to build a military road from Detroit to Fort Meigs (H).²⁵ No Congressional sanction was sought, and the Army built this 70-mile road through a swampy area with funds from its general appropriation.

In 1817, again with no resort to Congress, President Monroe ordered construction of a military road in New York state. Terminal sections of a route highly important to any future conflict with Britain were started by the troops in the late summer (I). The east section led from Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, west to French Mills on the Salmon River, which emptied into the St. Lawrence. The 50-mile western section ran from Sackett's Harbor at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, northeast to Morristown on the St. Lawrence. The War Department believed that the 65-mile section between these terminal parts would be completed by settlers moving into the area. The two sections were never perfected as roads by the military, apparently, but were cut their full length, and in part finished.²⁶

Congress, meanwhile, had not been entirely passive. As noted, it provided funds for Jackson's road. And in 1816 it called for construction of the Brownstown Treaty roads, built partly during the War of 1812 but by 1816 in hopeless condition. But four years later, no progress had been made and troop strength was insufficient to effect the

work.²⁷ Eventually, Congress authorized Ohio to build the western leg of the road as a state project, in 1823.²⁸ Thus Congress' part was small; it was executive action that was responsible for military roads immediately after the War of 1812.

Each of these roads—which penetrated the southern, northern, and northwestern frontiers—was conceived in the light of the harsh lessons of the War of 1812, and in the need for military strength. The tenor of the reports and the location of the roads plainly bear this out.²⁹ Yet one voice in early 1817 bespoke a broader function for the roads, and grasped their full importance to the nation. A Senate committee on internal improvements said that roads and canals would tie the community of states together "by the strongest ligatures," and would further commercial and social intercourse in the young nation.³⁰ The weight of this argument later was to strengthen measurably the progress of an expanded military roads program.

* *

As long as *military* roads were the consideration, Madison and Monroe could approve their construction. But when a *general*, federal internal improvements program was at issue, these two strict constructionists said that the Constitution stood in the way. As for Congress, it vacillated.

In 1816, Congress approved the "bonus bill," which provided that monies from the Bank of the United States would be pledged toward a general internal improvements fund. Madison vetoed the bill. In 1817, Monroe's inaugural message placed him squarely in line with Madison. The House asked a committee under Representative

²⁴ ASPMA, IV, 626.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 626; ASPM, II 988; U. S. Laws, VII, Ch. 153, p. 139.

²⁷ ASPM, II, 593.

²⁸ U. S. Laws, VII, Ch. 145, pp. 118-19.

²⁹ Cf. following in connection with the roads: Bassett, *op. cit.*, p. 235; ASPM, II, 593, 988; ASPMA, IV, 629.

³⁰ ASPM, II, 425.

Henry St. George Tucker of Virginia to report on Monroe's message as it related to roads and canals.

The committee argued cogently that military roads, post roads, and canals could be built by the federal government without violating the Constitution.³¹ It recommended a bill similar to the bonus bill, but when the new measure came to a vote in 1818, it was defeated.

The next major statement calling for military road construction came from Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, who in 1819 had not yet committed himself to states' rights and strict constructionism. His thesis, expanding that of the Senate committee of 1817, was that "the road . . . can scarcely be designated, which is highly useful for military operations, which is not equally required for the industry or political prosperity of the community."³² No country, he said, needed a good system of military roads and canals more than the United States. Had proper roads been built before the War of 1812, he added, they would have more than paid for themselves "in that single contest."

But Monroe continued to reject general internal improvements. He seemed willing that piecemeal construction of military roads be undertaken, so long as no blanket approval of the principle of federal internal improvements be expressed in a law. And under this tacit approval of the act but not the principle, Congress voted appropriations for military roads from the Mississippi River opposite Memphis to Little Rock, Arkansas Territory (L); and from Pensacola to St. Augustine in Florida, both in early 1824. (M).³³ Each act authorized troop construction. In the meantime, another road, 48 miles long, was built by the troops at the

order of the commanding general of the eighth military department, from Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, to Jackson's Military Road, in 1818-1819 (J). Also, the troops of the Missouri expeditions in 1819-1820 built a road from the mouth of the Grand River in Missouri Territory, to Council Bluffs (K).³⁴

Then on April 30, 1824, Monroe abandoned his constitutional scruples with regard to roads.³⁵ He signed the Survey Act of 1824, which called for federal surveys of routes for roads and canals necessary for commercial, military, or postal purposes. The Army Engineers were to play the major part in making the surveys. The new bill opened the door to many internal improvements. Military road-building found a considerable impetus, and in the dozen years to come, took on a clear pattern of construction to serve both military and national socio-economic needs.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM

Road construction now began in the Michigan, Florida, and Arkansas areas. The most aggressive program was in Michigan. Reconstruction of the Meigs-Detroit road was provided for within a month after the Survey Act. Less than a year later, Congress appointed commissioners to survey a road from Detroit to Chicago. Then in January, 1826, an insistent and alarming report on the need for military roads in Michigan came in a joint effort of the War Department and Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan Territory.³⁶

Cass was deeply concerned with the present danger of British-Indian collusion across the neck of land between Lakes Huron and Erie. The Chippewa Indians, he said, were the "most turbulent, disaffected savages" on

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 443-47.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 533 ff.

³³*U. S. Laws*, VII, Ch. 247, p. 214; *ibid.*, Ch. 252, p. 216.

³⁴*ASPMA*, II, 32; *ibid.*, IV, 625.

³⁵Frederic L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier* (Boston, New York, 1924), p. 248.

³⁶19th Cong., 1st Sess., *House Report* 42, Ser. 141, pp. 1-16.

the frontier, and they did not "disguise their foreign partialities." A road from Detroit to Saginaw Bay would give the Army access to the Chippewas (N). Since there was "nothing in the character of the British nation, and but little in her history" to indicate she would ever relinquish Canada, collusion between Britain and the Indians could be expected for years to come. Another road was needed from Detroit to Chicago, to cut through the heart of the Potawatami Indian country (O). A third road should go from Detroit to Fort Gratiot (outlet of Lake Huron) (P); and a fourth, from Detroit to Fort Meigs (H), should be pushed to repair and completion as planned earlier.

Graphically, he described the immense cost of the War of 1812 in the Northwest. "... fearful calls were made upon the Treasury, and . . . the expenses were beyond all proportion greater than in any section of the country" because "nature herself had imposed difficulties which could be surmounted only by unlimited means," he said. Michigan was practically isolated from the nation because of the swamps at its southern border. Cass also saw the roads as an immediate spur to migration of farmers into the back country, and to the settlement of the Territory.

For the War Department, Major General Jacob Brown painted a less lurid but equally urgent picture, harking back, as did all road enthusiasts, to the exhausting War of 1812. He argued more strongly than Cass the general benefit of the roads:

... any expense . . . for roads would be more than gained by the increased value which they would confer on the lands, the additional inducements offered for the settlement of them, and the security and defense guaranteed by safe communications. . . .

Congress could not ignore the prospect. Within a year it provided for roads as recommended by Cass, and later approved another, from Saginaw Bay to Mackinac

(Q).³⁷ In 1832 another half-dozen Michigan roads were authorized, but available evidence does not warrant calling them military roads.³⁸

The Michigan roads were built largely by contractors under supervision of the Army Engineers, and were expensive for the times. Largely completed by 1835, they required many appropriations, and the Detroit-Chicago road cost \$87,000, some of it in maintenance.

In Florida, the program began in the Pensacola area. In 1824, Quartermaster General Jesup ordered a short stretch of eight miles built by the troops from Pensacola to Fort Barrancas, at a cost of \$208.50 (R).³⁹ In the same year, another was opened at order of the War Department from Pensacola to Fort Mitchell, in southeastern Alabama, "to facilitate military communications" (S).⁴⁰ Congress, also in 1824, authorized a Pensacola-St. Augustine road, after some urging by the Army (M).⁴¹ The act also authorized surveys for roads the length of the east and west coasts of Florida.

Colonel James Gadsden, who did much of the surveying for the latter two roads, showed in his reports of late 1824 how thoroughly the "general benefit," rather than the narrower "military benefit," now pervaded the thinking of the road-builders. With perspicacity, he saw that the nation might eventually make productive areas of these coastal wastelands, if they were opened up by military roads.⁴² A few months later Congress approved a road from Coleraine, Georgia, to Tampa Bay (T); and, in 1827, it approved

³⁷*U. S. Laws*, VII, Ch. 766, p. 579.

³⁸*ASPMA*, V, 49.

³⁹*Ibid.*, IV, 626.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 628. A letter of Jesup's a year before the act showed the Army's plan to ask Congress for money for this road.

⁴²For these unusually perceptive and detailed reports, see *ASPMA*, III, 117-22.

the reopening of "Old King's Road," first built by the Spaniards, from Georgia to New Smyrna (U).⁴³

The five Florida military roads were largely finished by 1830. The longest was from Pensacola to St. Augustine, 367 miles long and costing some \$31,000. By way of comparison, it was somewhat longer than the Detroit-Chicago road, but cost less than half as much. Troops did most of the building in Florida; in Michigan, private contractors, directed by the Army Engineers, did more.

The Arkansas Territorial legislature opened the serious agitation for military roads on the Southwest frontier in 1820,⁴⁴ complaining that Arkansas was being slighted. In 1824 Congress approved a military road from the Mississippi River opposite Memphis, to Little Rock (L).⁴⁵ It was the first of 13 military roads authorized and built in the Territory during the next 15 years, and thus was the start of the heaviest concentration of military roads in the nation. A second was authorized in 1825, westward from Little Rock to Cantonment Gibson, 50 miles northwest of Fort Smith (V).⁴⁶ Two years later, after Jesup warned of the Indian menace and the proximity of a foreign nation (Mexico's Texas), Congress approved a road south from Smith to Fort Towson to the north border of Louisiana (W).⁴⁷ Jesup later took it upon himself to have the troops extend the road to Natchitoches, Louisiana.

Arkansas Territory, its program started

with these three military roads, waited until 1834 before Congress provided more, spurred by political and civil turmoil in Texas, and the government's removal of Indians from east of the Mississippi River. Both factors rendered the Arkansas frontier uneasy. In 1834 Congress authorized four roads: Helena, Arkansas, to the Mouth of the Cache River (east-central Arkansas) (X); Jackson (NE Arkansas) to Fayetteville (NW) to Fort Smith (west) (Y); Little Rock-Memphis Road to Batesville, Arkansas (N-central) (Z); and Columbia, Arkansas (SE), to Little Rock (central) (AA).⁴⁸ During the same year, the War Department used the troops to build four other roads west of the present western boundary of Arkansas through the lands of the removed Indians. These were: Towson west to the False Washita River (now the Washita) (BB); Gibson east to the Little Red River of Arkansas (CC); Little Red River to the False Washita (DD)⁴⁹; and Gibson to the north fork of the Canadian River (EE).⁵⁰

Completing the network of 13 military roads were two others: One, undertaken by the War Department in late 1832, filled in the gap between Smith and Towson with a road from Smith to Horse Prairie, a point just up the Red River from Towson.⁵¹ The other, approved by Congress in 1835, swept diagonally across the state, from the northeast to Fulton on the Red River in the southwest (FF, GG).⁵²

⁴³*U. S. Laws*, VII, Ch. 544, p. 422; *ibid.*, Ch. 761, p. 574; K. A. Hanna, *Florida, Land of Change* (Chapel Hill, 1941, 1948), p. 161.

⁴⁴D. T. Herndon, *Annals of Arkansas* (Little Rock, 1947), I, 374.

⁴⁵*U. S. Laws*, VII, Ch. 247, p. 214.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, Ch. 555, p. 427.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, Ch. 814, p. 605. As shown on the map, this apparently was not completed. Jesup said in his report of 1831 that construction between Smith and Towson was discontinued in 1828, when only 20 miles of this part had been built.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, IX, Ch. 130, pp. 103-04; *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IV, 718. Documentation that permits terming these "military roads" is slight. The Senate committee on roads and canals called them such in 1836. See *ASPMA*, VI, 985.

⁴⁹The route of this road, DD on the map, is highly questionable, and this writer makes no claim to its accuracy as indicated.

⁵⁰*ASPMA*, V, 384.

⁵¹Carolyn T. Foreman, "Report of Captain John Stuart." *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, V (September 1927), 333 ff.

⁵²*U. S. Laws*, IX, Ch. 302, p. 206.

The heavy concentration of military roads in Arkansas must be attributed primarily to military needs in an insecure area. A high concentration of restive Indians on the border and turmoil in adjoining Texas undoubtedly were the first reasons for building the eight roads in 1834. However, the pressures from road-starved frontiersmen must have been considerable. Arkansas became a territory in 1819 and a state in 1836. As her population grew in the 1830's, her need for roads grew. The policy of furthering the general socio-economic welfare of the nation and its citizens by building military roads, shown clearly in Michigan and Florida military road plans, applied in Arkansas also.

Two other frontiers were penetrated by military roads before 1836. The state of Maine got the first, approved in 1829 and built from Bangor to the Houlton garrison near Mars Hill on the far northeastern border of the nation (HH).⁵³ The recurrent worries over an aggressive Britain to the north brought repeated requests for this road, which was apparently intended for no purpose other than a military one.⁵⁴ The other frontier provided with a military road was in Wisconsin. Congressional approval for the road, from Fort Howard on Green Bay, Lake Michigan, to Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi River, came in 1830 (II).⁵⁵ The troops did the work. It was conceived first in the need for defense against Indians (Black Hawk's War came to Wisconsin in 1832), but soon proved to be "as invaluable as any railway has been since" for the frontiersman and the agricultural economy.⁵⁶

Thus the Army Engineers and Jesup's Quartermasters combined their talents and

the brawn of the troops to build networks of military roads on the rudest frontiers. John Quincy Adams, inveterate advocate of internal improvements, told enthusiastically in 1828 of what the military were doing for the nation.

While a portion of . . . the Corps of Engineers, is employed in constructing works of military defense, another portion . . . is co-operating with our citizen engineers, in developing the capacities of the country for internal improvement, and in building up works which belong exclusively to the department of political economy. The Quartermaster General . . . is engaged, not merely in erections and accommodations for the troops, but in the construction of roads and bridges for the citizens at large. Indeed the reports from these . . . departments exhibit the army of the United States . . . as a body . . . who probably contribute more than any other equal number of citizens, not only to the security of the country, but to the advancement of its useful arts.⁵⁷

Major General Edmund P. Gaines sounded the Army's position the same year. With a reference to the sad experience of the War of 1812, he said that roads and canals from the interior were "more essential to the . . . national defence than fortifications designed for . . . our seaports." Recommending more military roads and canals, he added that they "will never fail to be worth, for the ordinary purposes of commerce, as much, if not more, than the amount for their original construction."⁵⁸

Clearly by 1836, citizens, the Congress, the President, and the military had long been in accord as to the usefulness of the military road to the general welfare of the nation at peace as well as to the nation at war. But that year saw the emergence of a plan for a military road such as the nation had not known before. A combination of events stampeded Congress and the War Depart-

⁵³*Ibid.*, VIII, Ch. 101, p. 115.

⁵⁴*ASPM*, V, 11.

⁵⁵*U. S. Laws*, VIII, Ch. 443, p. 382.

⁵⁶H. E. Cole, "The Old Military Road," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, IX (1925-1926), 51.

⁵⁷20th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Sen. Doc.* 1, Ser. 181, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁸*ASPM*, IV, 141.

ment into developing a plan for a 1,000-mile military road from Fort Snelling at the mouth of the St. Peter's (Minnesota) River to Fort Towson on the Red River of the South—the "great military road for the defence of the western frontiers against the Indians."

THE GREAT MILITARY ROAD

In 1836, the United States Army was involved in three endeavors which brought home to the nation its still-hazardous position. A war, a near-war, and the evacuation of Indians from their homes east of the Mississippi River were in progress. The war was being waged in Florida against the Seminole Indians; not until 1842 was it ended. The near-war threatened at the Louisiana-Texas border, which was in a state of high nervousness as Texas broke away from Mexico. From Louisiana, Major General Gaines called for reinforcements. They were sent, and Cass and Jesup estimated that military preparations on the frontier would cost \$1,000,000.⁵⁹ But even after Santa Anna's defeat in April, 1836, the United States remained apprehensive.

The Seminole War was a direct outgrowth of the government's Indian removal policy. The Seminoles fought to prevent migration from their central Florida reservation to lands west of Arkansas. The Indian removal operation had begun before 1820, and after frequent requests from government and civilian quarters, was established as policy by Congress in an act of 1830. Behind the law was the impossible situation for eastern Indians living in enclaves, corrupted and decimated in their inability to adapt to the ways of white men; and the desire of whites for reservation lands. Removal of the Indians to the west and north of Arkansas Territory meant, it was thought, that they could "devote themselves to the chase" of buffalo and

deer, or if they wished, "cultivate the arts of civilization."⁶⁰ This country was part of the area then called the "Great American Desert," and the whites thought they would never want it. The law named the 95th meridian as the eastern boundary of the "permanent Indian frontier."

Cass reported glowingly in November 1832 on the "land of refuge . . . abundantly extensive and fertile for the support of the Indians . . . admirably adapted to their situations and wants." But just two years later, Cass changed his key to a lower, graver pitch. By 1834, some 30,000 Indians had been removed to their new lands, and nearly 50,000 more were still to be removed. The tribes, he said, "will there be brought into juxtaposition . . . and . . . possibly into collision, with the native tribes of that country."⁶¹ To preserve peace, new legislation was needed.

And in December, 1835, the citizens of Clay County, Missouri, petitioned Congress to realize their perilous position growing from the policy of colonizing Indians on the Missouri frontier.⁶² The number of Indians was increasing constantly, and at the same time the elk and buffalo were retreating out of the area, and "the profits of the chase . . . diminishing." Tribes whose habits had withstood "the contagious touch of civilization for centuries without any material and radical change in their modes of life," could not be made into farmers. They said:

When this policy of the country shall have been accomplished, and the chase of the . . . buffalo shall have ceased, then will the restless and jarring spirit of the Indians manifest itself in bloody wars . . . and invasions of our . . . homes. . . .

For protection, they wanted a system of forts and a military road patrolled by dragoons, stretching from the upper Mississippi River to the Red River of the South.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, IV, 3-4.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, V, 22, 361.

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 730-32.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, VI, 412.

Within three weeks, Cass reported favorably on the idea to the Senate.⁶³ He liked particularly the concept of the thousand-mile-long road, "a barrier across which parties of Indians would be very unwilling to pass, as they would be liable to be intercepted" by patrolling dragoons. Supporting him in the absence of Jesup was Acting Quartermaster General Thomas F. Hunt, lavishly enthusiastic in his report. Small parties moving between posts, keeping a "continual *surveillance* over the road . . . would operate as an immense line of defence," and the road would be of "incalculable advantage" in any Indian war, Hunt wrote.

By March, 1836, the House military affairs committee had reported a bill for the posts and the road.⁶⁴ Jesup, approving, said the road would be built by troops and work would be limited to bridges and causeways. Four new military posts would cost \$65,000 and the road would cost \$35,000. The program was the only way, he added, to keep peace on the frontier. Cass added his endorsement.

Then on July 2, 1836, a Congress much concerned with an Indian war in progress and a foreign nation that had just effected a revolution on the United States border, and with no choice but to make the Indian removal plan work somehow, passed an act in line with the War Department's suggestions.⁶⁵ It appropriated the \$100,000 suggested by Jesup for posts and road. The road was to lead from a point on the right bank of the Mississippi River between the St. Peter's and Des Moines Rivers, and extend to the Red River of the South. The posts and a road that would be a "barrier" to Indians were to secure the frontier at last.

But the next year, with the advent of J. R. Poinsett as the new Secretary of War, a sud-

den, vigorous opposition to the road sprang at Congress. In the closing weeks of 1837, Poinsett's report to the Senate said construction would begin soon, "unless, upon a deliberate review of the whole matter, some more eligible plan of defence should be adopted. He opposed the road, and wrote bluntly:

The only possible use of such a road would be to facilitate occasional communication between the posts in time of peace. Supplies would not be transported along it, for they must be brought from the interior. Succors could not reach the posts by that direction for they would be furnished by the militia within the line; and any attempt to concentrate the forces composing the garrisons in the event of an outbreak would probably be attended with disastrous consequences, for the troops. . . . The enemy, having nothing to dread on their flanks or rear, might approach this road without risk.⁶⁶

Cass, Jesup, Hunt, the Missourians, the House military affairs committee, and the Congress were at a single stroke in danger of being demolished in their approval for the "great military road." More damaging than Poinsett's words were those of Acting Quartermaster General T. Cross, serving while Jesup was in Florida fighting the Seminoles. The road, Cross said,

. . . violates a fundamental principle of military science. The lines of communication should be . . . *perpendicular* to the frontier, not *parallel* with it. The resources of an army are always presumed to be in its rear, from whence it can draw supplies and reinforcements under cover of its own protection and . . . secured from interruption by the enemy.⁶⁷

Poinsett furnished the Senate with a map of the forts and roads he recommended, and another showing the plan of Charles Gratiot, chief of the Army Engineers.⁶⁸ Both maps

⁶⁶ ASPMA, VII, 778.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 783.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 780. Gratiot tendered a long written defense plan, never mentioning the great military road, but saying the routes he had in mind would provide "all the facilities . . . the service can require for . . .

⁶³ *Ibid.*, VI, 13.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-54.

⁶⁵ U. S. Laws, IX, Ch. 648, p. 444.

showed a north-south route from Fort Snelling to the Red River; but both were devoted first to routes to the frontier.

Cross repeated his protest in his part of the War Department annual report in late November 1837.⁶⁹ At about the same time, Congress received letters it had solicited from various frontier officials, concerning the worth of the plan. Of about a dozen received, three approved the road and the rest were non-committal.⁷⁰ In January, 1838, Cross again attacked the plan, and at the end of the year, Poinsett's annual report renewed the objection, declaring the road would be inflammatory to the Indians' state of mind. But he had no choice but to report that work on the great road, between Fort Leavenworth and the Marias de Cygne River (apparently a branch of the Osage, at present-day La-Cygne, Kansas) had started.⁷¹

Poinsett managed the next year to eliminate the long section from Leavenworth north to Snelling, which was open prairie. But his strong phrases and good logic never turned Congress away from the rest of the road. By late 1839, the Leavenworth-de Cygne leg of the road (72 miles) was finished, and a southern section, from the Red to the Arkansas River (140 miles) also. In 1840 another 86 miles from Marias de Cygne to Spring River in south Kansas were reported complete. By this time, the road was a reality, and Poinsett never again mentioned it in an annual report.

Jesup never gave up his enthusiasm for the road. His section of the 1839 annual report (he had returned from the Seminole wars) favored the road; Poinsett's section condemned it. Jesup wangled \$5,000 from


intercourse with the frontier." He apparently felt that ignoring the great military road scheme was his best method of telling the Senate what he thought of it.

Poinsett's and Gratiot's routes shown here are as shown on the maps *ibid.*, opp. p. 781.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 605.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 956-65.

⁷¹25th Cong., 3rd Sess., *Sen. Doc. 1*, Ser. 338, pp. 99, 141.



Congress in 1841 to complete the 120-mile section between Spring River and Fort Smith, and said he planned to shift from contract to troop construction here.⁷² It seems clear from subsequent reports that the entire \$100,000 originally appropriated for both forts and road went only for the road.⁷³

Whether Army or civilians ever made much use of the road, 420 miles long and stretching from Leavenworth to Towson, is

⁷²27th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Sen. Doc. 1*, Ser. 395, p. 109.

⁷³29th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Sen. Doc. 44*, Ser. 494, p. 16.

obscure. The 140 miles between the Red and Arkansas Rivers was good enough in 1839 to permit an Army officer with 14 oxen to travel it in eight and one-half days.⁷⁴ It could scarcely have been of much importance to the frontier to escape notice by historians. The problems inherent in the permanent Indian frontier were largely responsible for the great military road as an idea and as a reality. Congressional jitters over general military problems also contributed.

The purpose for which the road was built does not appear to have been served, and in logic Poinsett and Cross had easily the stronger position. The controversy to which the road gave rise occupied the War Department for more than three years. It showed a Congress unwilling to retreat from the position to which it was committed by the law it passed in 1836, despite a powerful, sensible, and well-stated case. Moreover, the mere existence of controversy injected conflict and turmoil into a well-established policy of military road-building.

SUMMARY

Establishment of a federal policy of military road-building to fill the nation's military and socio-economic needs alike came in four fairly distinct steps. The first was the period prior to the War of 1812, when the Army was building what roads it needed in war and peace and helping the Post Office Department as it could. The peacetime operation was limited, apparently, to the roads needed for the maintenance of forts and posts.

The second stage was the experience of the War of 1812. General Hull, crying in an inundated wilderness to his distant superiors that "it is unnecessary to detail the difficulties I have to encounter in the March of this

Army . . . it is only for me to surmount them," sounded the first note of desperate need for a military road program, the lack of which meant disaster to Hull's army and incredible difficulties to his successor's.⁷⁵ It taught those responsible for the nation's fighting prowess that they must construct military roads; for two decades they could not forget the tragedy of armies floundering in a swamp.

A struggle to realize the program of necessary roads followed the War of 1812 as the third step. The Executive and the Army built the basis for this program through summary construction of a few highly-important roads. Not until Monroe gave way and signed the Survey Act of 1824 was a broad program possible. This period also saw the recognition, in Calhoun's report of 1819, of the military road in a dual role—serving the military and the socio-economic need.

The fourth phase was development of the roads under law, following passage of the Survey Act. Calhoun's ideas became policy and practice, and the Michigan, Florida and Arkansas networks were the issue. The controversy over the great military road of the west actually was a thing apart—it had no bearing on the general federal policy toward military roads, except as its presence may have disrupted the practice of this policy. It was a debate in tactics and strategy.

The Army must have built many roads before 1836, besides those detailed herein. But the military roads important enough to warrant notice in annual reports, committee reports, and special recapitulations were the ones around which the federal policy appears to have been built. They stand first as a monument to the ability of generals and politicians to profit from the hard lessons of the War of 1812.

⁷⁴Louis Pelzer, *Marches of the Dragoons in the Mississippi Valley* (Iowa City, 1917), p. 80.

⁷⁵E. A. Cruikshank (ed.), "Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit," *Canada Archives Publications* (Ottawa, 1912), VII, 36.

CLAUSEWITZ AND DEMOCRACY'S MODERN WARS

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ON WAR, the best known of Clausewitz' works, was conceived by Clausewitz in 1816 or 1817 as a scientific attempt "to investigate the essence of the phenomena of war and to show their connection with the nature of the things of which they are composed."¹ He saw the era of the Napoleonic Wars, which had just come to a close, as one in which "war itself, as it were, had been lecturing." Through a study of the history of these and other wars he sought to establish fundamental principles which would furnish a universally valid basis for explaining the nature of war in general.

Like other writers, he recognized that the revolution in warfare which had emerged in his era was the product of fundamental social and political changes which made war "an affair of the people."² He pointed out that this participation of the people had turned loose "the primitive violence of war, freed from all conventional restrictions."³ Then, discussing the future, he said "whether this will always be the case, whether all future wars in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the states, and, consequently, take place only on account of great interests closely affecting the people, or whether a separation of the government from the people will gradually arise again, would be a difficult point to settle. . . ."⁴

In his time, it would have been a difficult point to settle. In our time, with the advantage of hindsight, it is simple to observe that

the social and political changes which Clausewitz saw emerging after the French Revolution have indeed continued. Moreover, they have been accompanied by advances in the means of communication which are, upon contemplation, astonishing even in our age. In a communications sense, the world is now only a fraction of its size in Clausewitz' day. A "separation of the government from the people" has not risen again; authoritarian governments have vastly greater power to influence and control their citizens; democratic governments possess a measure of this power, but are on the other hand much more subject to direct influence from the opinions of their citizens. There have been other profound social and political changes. Moreover, they have occurred in an era in which war itself has again been lecturing. It is worthwhile, therefore, to apply Clausewitz' theory to a brief study of the nature of wars waged by modern democracies.

Clausewitz held that there were two kinds of wars; the first was absolute or real war, in which in theory each of the nations involved sought the overthrow of the other and consequently mobilized all their resources in an effort to overthrow and to avoid being overthrown. The other was a war with a more limited aim, in which the effort is less than absolute, being proportionate to the worth of the objective.⁵ In both cases, however, the object of the war must govern the conduct of it, "for the political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object."⁶

¹Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (tr. by O. J. Matthijs Jolles; New York: Modern Library, 1943), p. xxxii.

²*Ibid.*, p. 582.

³*Ibid.*, p. 583.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 583-84.

⁵*Ibid.* This paragraph summarizes views expressed by Clausewitz in his prefatory notes and in Book VIII, *passim*.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 16.

Absolute or real war does not actually occur, in Clausewitz' view, because nations resort to force of arms only to gain political objectives; warfare is the continuation of state policy and is therefore moderated by considerations of policy. Clausewitz holds that all wars are fought for political considerations:

That the political point of view should end completely when war begins would only be conceivable if wars were struggles of life and death, from pure hatred. As wars are in reality, they are, as we said before, only the manifestations of policy itself. The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.⁷

Clausewitz' concept certainly appears to be a fair statement of what war *should* be, but is this actually the nature of *all* wars? Compare Clausewitz' view with the following statements from authorities writing on World War II. General of the Army Omar Bradley, in the preface to his book, has the following to say:

The American army has also acquired a political maturity it sorely lacked at the outbreak of World War II. At times during that war we forgot that wars are fought for the resolution of political conflicts, and in the ground campaign for Europe we sometimes overlooked political considerations of vast importance. Today, after several years of cold war, we are intensely aware that a military effort cannot be separated from political objectives.⁸

Consider also the following:

Mr. Churchill . . . dwelt at length on . . . the importance of assailing Germany through the "soft underbelly. . . .

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 598.

⁸Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Holt, 1951).

I could not escape a feeling that Mr. Churchill's views were . . . colored by . . . his concern as a political leader for the future of the Balkans. . . . *As a soldier*, I was particularly careful to exclude such considerations from my own recommendations.⁹

These extracts reveal that American commanders in the most important theater of war excluded political considerations from their planning, and concentrated strictly on military objectives. However, this fact does not invalidate Clausewitz' thesis unless political leaders were unable to direct the war in accordance with political objectives. The fact is, however, that no political objectives were given by their government to the American military personnel concerned with planning the conduct of the war. War Department planners were complaining in 1941 that their plans were based "on a more or less nebulous national policy."¹⁰ Similarly, Britain had no clearly defined political objective: "For the time being the defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism is a sufficient war aim and will open the door to every worthy war aim."¹¹

The Allied war aim with respect to Germany was finally announced in January 1943 as "unconditional surrender." Unconditional surrender is hardly a political objective; if it is, it is indistinguishable from Clausewitz' military objective, the disarming and overthrow of the enemy. The conclusion is inescapable that the war against Germany was conducted by the United States and Great Britain on purely military grounds, and that the one political objective placed before the

⁹Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948), p. 194. My emphasis.

¹⁰Mark S. Watson (The War Department), *The U. S. Army in World War II: Chief of Staff, Prewar Plans and Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1950), pp. 341 ff.

¹¹Winston L. S. Churchill, speech to the Central Council of the Conservative Association, March 28, 1940. Quoted in Stephen King-Hall, *Total Victory* (London: Faber and Faber, 1941), p. 149.

commander of Allied forces in Europe by an Allied political leader was both advocated and rejected solely on military grounds.¹²

It is thus apparent that, at least in this one case, Clausewitz' theory does not hold true. But, if it is not true in all cases, it is unacceptable as a general theory aimed at explaining war. Accordingly, the theory that war is always aimed at accomplishing a political objective must be examined in the light of another of Clausewitz' theories: that the more powerful the motives for war—the more violent the tensions preceding it—the more it will actually coincide with its abstract concept of absolute and unlimited violence.¹³

Several factors suggest that modern wars do tend to become more nearly "struggles of life and death, from pure hatred" than "continuations of state policy."

The first and most significant of these lies in the nature of modern democracy. Democratic nations can enter wars only when public opinion favors this course, since democracies are by definition and in fact responsive to public opinion coherently expressed. Since wars are fought by mass armies conscripted largely from the voting population, and since this population has shown a wise reluctance to risk death or wounds except for what it considers adequate cause, the prewar tensions and provocations must reach the point which is considered personally intolerable by a large part of the population before the government can resort to war. Moreover, in the case of the United States, there appears to be a fairly large segment of the population which is unaware of any threat to national security unless that threat is made unmistakably clear by an overt act or a series of overt acts.¹⁴ This appears also to be the case

with the British population, although it is perhaps less true of the British than of the United States.

Both these populations, however, are influenced by a number of idealistic, abstract ideas regarding good and evil, fair and foul, and the virtues of their form of government in contrast to that of other countries.¹⁵ It is usually on the basis of these stereotyped concepts, rather than on the actual concrete issues involved, that they can be most effectively motivated toward war, and it is most often to these images—rather than to reason and judgment—that the press and other media and political leaders appeal in seeking to lead public opinion toward war.¹⁶ This is true even when the nature of the war, or the potential enemy's activities, threatens an interest so vital that reason and sound judgment would dictate a resort to war. As a result, democratic peoples tend to make war on an emotional, rather than rational, basis. They enter war when they view it as a threat to their national existence or their "way of life," but opinion becomes unified in this view through an emotional appeal to democratic stereotypes. The enemy nation is seen as the danger to democracy, rather than the threatening situation which the enemy nation has been trying to create. Therefore, the destruction of the enemy nation—not restoration of a favorable situation—becomes the objective of the war.

Moreover, when public opinion finally consolidates in this view, all energies are voluntarily turned toward effective pursuit of the objective. Democracy becomes the avenging angel, seeking to destroy its enemy in the

¹²See Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, pp. 281 ff.
¹³Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 17.

¹⁴See Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
¹⁵See Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950). Chapter XXIII is devoted to a detailed treatment of the sources of U. S. conduct.
¹⁶Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: MacMillan, 1947), chapters VI, XXV.

name of just retribution. Having created in the public mind a belief that the aim of the war is to preserve the nation and/or its way of life, the political leaders set in motion currents which they are powerless to control. They cannot then represent the motive for the war in its true political light. Further, the emotional mood created in the people feeds back to the leaders, and tends to make their attitude toward the war correspond to the image which they have themselves created.¹⁷ J. F. C. Fuller, after discussing events prior to the war and the "true war aim" for Britain which the government "feared to proclaim," describes this process in Britain:

Instead, when on 3rd September, 1939, war was declared, the aim was proclaimed to be a moral one. This placed the conflict on the footing of a crusade, that is, of an *ideological* in contradistinction to a *political* war—a war to annihilate Hitler and Hitlerism, as St. George annihilated the Dragon. This is made crystal clear in the declarations of all parties in the House of Commons. . . .

Thus, instead of the minds of the people being directed towards the re-establishment of the balance of power, their reason was obliterated by a spirit of hatred for the "evil thing," and to them the war became a contest between Good and Evil. This emotional aim, as we shall see, not only placed the war on a total footing, but eventually led to the very end Britain had fought against over four hundred years—the establishment of a hegemony over Europe by a foreign power.¹⁸

It is almost superfluous to mention similar evidence that the United States' aim in the Second World War was destruction of the "evil thing": Hitler and Hitlerism, Tojo and Japanese "militarism." The manner in which the war was conducted furnishes ample evidence that this was the case. In addition, we might note in passing the previously quoted

statements of Generals Eisenhower and Bradley; President Roosevelt's famous "unconditional surrender"; and General Eisenhower's book title, *Crusade in Europe*.

As for the First World War, it is hardly necessary to mention such familiar phrases as "make the world safe for democracy," "the war to end wars," and so on *ad absurdum*. Even the President of the United States viewed the war and the enemy in terms of democratic stereotypes—witness the Fourteen Points and the refusal to deal with the Kaiser's government, even to accept its surrender.

What of the war in Korea, in which considerably less than the maximum of violence was generated by the democratic participants? Events in Korea strengthen the thesis that democratic peoples will not wholeheartedly support a war unless they feel their security to be directly threatened. It must be remembered that United States participation was based upon a decision made by the President and not upon a declaration of war. The tendency to look upon the objective of war as destruction of the enemy is illustrated by the advance to the Yalu, whereas the political objective of the war was stated to be prevention of the conquest of South Korea. The "Great Debate" which followed the Chinese intervention revealed a clear contrast in the views of the minority, who thought the United States should extricate itself from the war, and the majority who thought that the United States should seek a decision by extending the war by air and naval attacks—including atomic attacks—against China.¹⁹ It would be difficult to find a more clear-cut example of the tendency to view the choice as between no war at all or complete annihilation of the enemy than is represented in these points of view.

¹⁷Lippmann, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁸John F. C. Fuller, *The Second World War 1939-1945* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948), pp. 26-7. Fuller quotes excerpts from speeches in Commons which document his statement.

¹⁹See Brookings Institution, *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1951-1952* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1951), pp. 12 ff.

One further point must be added to complete the picture of the nature of modern democratic wars. In a democracy, there are many shades of opinion, of which the most important are represented by the major political parties. To conduct the affairs of government effectively, the party—or coalition of parties—in power must have a working majority in the legislature. It thus becomes a necessary aim of the party in power to retain control of this body, and unity within the party or coalition in power is necessary if this aim is to be accomplished. In wartime, all parties can agree on defeat of the enemy as an objective of the war. However, since the various parties are divided on domestic issues and usually on foreign policy issues as well, it is much more difficult to reach agreement on the political objectives—the kind of conditions which it is the aim of the nation to establish in the postwar world. Thus, in a democracy, a statement during the war on the political aims of the war is likely to produce political dissensions—and threaten control of the legislative body—at a time when the need for unity is greatest. If the divisions are serious enough, destruction of the enemy may be the only basis for conduct of the war on which agreement can be reached. If there is less serious division, a wider area of agreement may be possible; but so long as political parties remain, the reason for their existence is also the reason for inability to reach agreement on all the political objectives of the war. As a consequence, the party in power and the opposition combine to conduct the war on the narrowest grounds of agreement between them: the annihilation of the enemy. Churchill's explanation of this is illuminating:

It is because of the interests of national unity that I have forborne to produce a catalogue of war aims or peace aims; everyone knows quite well what we are fighting about,

but if you try to set forth in a catalogue what will be the exact settlement of affairs in a period which as I say is unforeseeable, if you attempt to do that you will find that the moment you leave the area of pious platitude you will descend into the area of heated controversy, and that would militate against the efforts we are making, and we could not in justice to our country take such a step. I was very glad to see that . . . President Roosevelt is of the same opinion. . . . In speaking of the mission of his new Ambassador to this country . . . President Roosevelt when he asked what instructions were given to the Ambassador about peace aims, replied that he did not see much use in talking about peace aims until Hitler had been defeated.²⁰

Within a coalition of democracies—and twentieth century wars have been and apparently will be fought by democratic coalitions—the problem of selecting political objectives is magnified several times. The national interests of the nations forming the coalition are not identical, and as a result democratic coalitions are always against a nation or combination of nations which threatens the members of the coalition; they are never “for” something.²¹ The common factor which makes the alliance possible is the common fear of the enemy, and the one aim upon which the members of the alliance can agree is the removal of the source of their fear. As a result, even the national political interests which have been formulated must be subordinated, in the interests of unity within the coalition, to defeating the enemy.

In summary, then, all the forces which influence the conduct of modern democratic wars tend to sublimate the political aims of the war to the objective of destroying the enemy. The record of three democratic wars

²⁰Quoted in King-Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50.

²¹See Edgar A. Mowrer and Marthe Rajchman, *Global War* (New York: Morrow and Company, 1942), p. 125. These authors hold that this is the nature of all coalitions, and that removal of the danger automatically evokes collapse of the coalition.

in the twentieth century establishes that modern democracies *tend* to make war precisely in the form Clausewitz described as unreasonable and impossible: "struggles of life and death, from pure hatred" in which political objectives are *necessarily subordinated* to emotional and military objectives and the interests of unity. The inherent nature of democratic wars is thus more nearly that of Clausewitz' theoretical war: "an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds."²²

²²Quoted in Edward M. Earle *et al*, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 102.

The most serious aspect of the phenomenon of democratic war is the evidence that wars which have been brought by the democracies to a satisfactory conclusion militarily have produced unsatisfactory results politically. If this situation is to be altered, democratic political and military leaders must first recognize that there is a problem. Secondly, they must discover and apply the measures necessary to make democratic war what Clausewitz held wars inherently are: "the continuation of state policy by other means."

SEMINAR ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

S T. JOHN'S COLLEGE, Annapolis, Maryland, and the American Military Institute, Washington, D. C., are continuing their joint venture of a Seminar on the Philosophy of War. This seminar is held in both Washington and Annapolis. Dr. Philip A. Crowl of the Army's Office of the Chief of Military History, and Asst. Professor Gerald A. Wheeler of the U. S. Naval Academy are the leaders of the Annapolis group; and George J. Stansfield of the National War College Library, and Colonel James D. Hittle of the Marine Corps are the leaders of the Washington group. The subject matter covered in both readings and discussions emphasizes the theme: How have human beings in the past coped with the manifold problems that war raises? The 1955 spring term places special emphasis on 19th century problems with topics such as "War and Manifest Destiny," "Economic Foundations of War," "Interpreters of Napoleon: Clausewitz and Jomini," and "The Navy and National Power." The Washington meetings will be held Thursday evenings, 8 to 10 p.m., for the spring months, in Room 1137, Navy Department Building, Constitution Avenue, N.W. Complete information and details of registration may be obtained from the St. John's College, Adult Education Office, Annapolis, Maryland, or from George J. Stansfield, 617 S. Washington St., Alexandria, Virginia.

NAVY POLICY TOWARD THE LABOR RELATIONS OF ITS WAR CONTRACTORS

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PART II*

LATER YEARS OF THE WAR— STABILIZATION PROCEDURE

The later years of the war, from 1943 to 1945, were marked by development of the early procedures begun in the defense period of 1941 and in the first rush of full mobilization after Pearl Harbor, not by the discovery of wholly new avenues of attack. The central feature of this development was the gradual concentration of authority for both wage stabilization and labor-disputes settlement in the National War Labor Board. Contributing to this result was the important Executive Order 9250 of October 1942, bearing on wage stabilization, and the War Labor Disputes Act adopted in the midst of the nationwide soft-coal strike in June 1943. The effects of each of these will be considered in turn.

As a result of Executive Order 9250, the NWLB brought wage stabilization and labor disputes in the shipbuilding industry effectively under its control on January 9, 1943, when it created a new agency called the Ship-

building Commission and empowered it to settle all labor disputes and to approve or disapprove all voluntary wage applications in the industry, subject only to review by the NWLB itself.⁴⁵ This reduced the old Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee to a relatively minor role. Not only was the new Commission given broad power to approve wage changes other than those submitted through the zonal agreements, i.e., all local changes, but no new zonal rate was to become effective until approved by the NWLB as well as the SSC.

The new Commission was like the old Stabilization Committee in form, but not in concept: it was tripartite, with the government representation divided between the procurement agencies and a "public" agency, the War Production Board. There were two representatives from labor, two from management, two from procurement (Navy and Maritime Commission) and one from WPB. The Navy representative was Rear Admiral Fisher.⁴⁶ The WPB representative was Paul R. Porter, who served as Chairman of both

*PART I appeared in *Military Affairs*, XVIII, 4 (Winter 1954), pp. 176-187.

⁴⁵*Termination Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 854.

⁴⁶*Ordway, op. cit.*, page 443.

the Stabilization Committee and the new Commission. But on the new Commission, Mr. Porter regarded himself as a representative of the "public," not the procurement agencies, that is, he adopted the national point of view of the reviewing authority, the NWLB. The new concept was to apply a national pattern of wage adjustment, balancing the union demands for increases against the national requirements for stabilization. The older view of the Navy and Maritime Commission representatives was simply to speed production within the industry by any effective means. As described by an official history:

As representatives of procurement agencies, they felt obligated to keep the cost of construction and repair of vessels as low as possible, but the record shows that they approved some higher wage rates than the subsequent Commission when labor and management agreed and when it was indicated that the rates would attract labor to the yard in question. As "public" members of the Commission, they were not always fully familiar with the policies, rules and regulations of the National War Labor Board, and tended to diverge from such policies on several non-wage matters such as union security. Their dual capacity did not prove conducive to the most efficient operation of the Commission, as evidenced by the small number of cases decided in relation to the case load.⁴⁷

The Commission tended to line up, in several cases, with management and the procurement agencies on one side, and the unions and Chairman Porter on the other. This gave the former group the majority, but things did not necessarily stop there. The majority view of the Commission could be reviewed and reversed by the NWLB. However, if the NWLB itself issued an order, the Navy and Maritime Commission could nullify it by refusing to reimburse the contractors for costs arising under the order. Thus the NWLB and the procurement agencies could effectively veto one another's rulings. The situation became so difficult that on one occasion the

union members refused to sit on the Commission.⁴⁸

A compromise was offered on July 9, 1943, in the form of a joint statement of "policy in relation to the shipbuilding industry" signed by Assistant Secretary Bard, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, USA, of the War Department, and Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, USN, of the Maritime Commission. This joint statement declared that the three agencies would "accept" payments by a contractor made in conformity with a mandatory Directive Order of the NWLB in a dispute case, but only that "consideration will be given" to allowing payments under a permissive order of approval of the NWLB approving a voluntary application for wage adjustments or under the terms of a general order of the NWLB.⁴⁹

This evidently was not satisfactory to the NWLB, for it proceeded to disestablish the Shipbuilding Commission on August 2, 1943, and to create an entirely new Commission a week later. The old Stabilization Committee was continued unchanged, however.⁵⁰

The second Shipbuilding Commission, as it was set up in August 1943, omitted all representatives of procurement agencies. The World War I pattern of divided government representation was finally abandoned, and the NWLB II form adopted: two representatives of management, two of labor, and two of the *non-procurement* public—the latter being all appointees of the NWLB. One of the new public members, William E. Simkin, served as Chairman until October 1944, when he was succeeded by William H. McPherson.

Chairman Simkin immediately invited the procurement agencies to send a joint liaison representative to all meetings of the Commission. The representative was not to have the

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pages 854-856. Also see *History of Bu Ships*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chap. 16, page 15; and Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 474.

⁴⁹NPD, Para. 13,311.

⁵⁰*Termination Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 856-857.

⁴⁷*Termination Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 855.

power to vote or to take motions, but was invited to present any information obtained by the three agencies as well as their views on pending matters. In return, the agencies were to be given copies of the minutes of Commission meetings, digests of pending cases, orders of the various types, and all information distributed to Commission members.⁵¹

Mr. Bard replied, accepting the principles of the Chairman's letter and indicating that an officer on the labor relations staff in his office would be appointed liaison representative. Such an officer was appointed and attended sessions of the Commission almost daily for many months. While the procurement agencies did not rescind their joint statement of policy of July 9, 1943, the exchange of information and views at Commission meetings ironed out many difficulties and resulted in the general acceptance of Commission rulings by the three agencies.

The new Shipbuilding Commission, of course, worked harmoniously with the NWLB: and in due course, the contracting agencies came to recognize that, in time of war, the national wage stabilization policy must be made by Congress and the President, be enforced by a civilian agency expressly designated for the purpose, and prevail in case of conflict, over procurement policy. In a directive dated February 9, 1944, Mr. Bard pointed out that under Executive Order 9250, the NWLB had jurisdiction over all wage payments not exceeding \$5000 in annual amount, made to employees who are represented by a union, and declared that "only the NWLB . . . may determine whether any wage . . . payment has been made in contravention of controlling provisions of law under the National Wage and Salary Stabilization Program."⁵²

⁵¹*History of Bu Ships, op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chap. 16, pages 15-22. *Termination Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 860.

⁵²NPD, Paras. 13,342-13,343.

Not long after the Navy and other procurement agencies were removed from the Shipbuilding Commission, the NWLB took similar action with respect to the Wage Adjustment Board in the general construction industry. On October 13, 1943, it issued General Order No. 13, which reconstituted the Wage Adjustment Board in a tripartite form comparable to that of the NWLB and the second Shipbuilding Commission. For the first time, industry was given representation, and the public members included no representatives of the Navy, Army or RFC. The new Board consisted of three representatives of industry, three of the unions, and three of the *non-procurement* public. The public members included the two officials of the Department of Labor who had previously been affiliated, Mr. Tracy and Mr. Hill, plus a third member having the national viewpoint of the NWLB, John T. Dunlop.⁵³

At the same time, the NWLB extended the jurisdiction of the Board to cover non-Federal as well as Federal construction. It also empowered the Board to pass upon dispute cases as well as voluntary requests for wage adjustments. Like the second Shipbuilding Commission, the Board now was no longer a voluntary agency of unions and government contracting-departments; it was an instrument of Presidential and Congressional stabilization policy.

In effect, the Navy and other procurement agencies had been relieved of the stabilization responsibilities which they had assumed voluntarily at a time when very little else was being done about it.⁵⁴

In March, 1944, the responsibility for determining allowable costs for reimbursement of contractors, which had been tightly held by the Office of the Assistant Secretary, was partially decentralized to the interested bu-

⁵³*Termination Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 1201-1203.

⁵⁴Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 473-475. Porter, *op. cit.*, page 351.

reaus. The Bureau of Ships was given authority to make "policy decisions" affecting the shipbuilding industry, and the Bureau of Yards and Docks similar decisions regarding the construction industry, both subject to the prior approval of the Assistant Secretary.⁵⁵

The Bureau of Ships also was given responsibility for maintaining liaison with the Shipbuilding Commission, Maritime Commission, War Shipping Administration, and War Department in matters pertaining to the stabilization program of that industry, and for supplying Navy representation on the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee. The Bureau of Yards and Docks was directed to maintain liaison with the Wage Adjustment Board and the Shipbuilding Commission of the NWLB.

In order to carry out these new responsibilities, both bureaus set up small industrial relations sections. The Bureau of Ships appointed five officers, headed by a Lieutenant Commander, within the Contract Branch of the Shipbuilding Division.⁵⁶ Besides maintaining liaison with other government agencies, as described above, these sections kept in close touch with the District Labor Relations Officers in the field, obtaining and giving information bearing on labor disputes.⁵⁷

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT—LATER YEARS OF THE WAR

In the later years of the war, the authority of the National War Labor Board was vastly increased in the field of labor-dispute settlement as well as in that of wage stabilization. Whereas the National Defense Mediation Board had been able merely to mediate or to recommend, the NWLB II had been able from the first to issue "directive orders" be-

cause of the national no-strike, no-lockout agreement to which leading union and management officials subscribed. These "orders" were in the nature of voluntary arbitration. However, the "orders" were neither reviewable in the courts nor enforceable in the courts, since the Board was merely a Presidential creation. Legally either party was free to treat them as recommendations which they might reject.

The NWLB had powerful support from its sponsor, President Roosevelt, and later from President Truman, however, and on about fifty occasions referred cases of non-compliance with its "orders" to him. In a few of these cases, the President was able to obtain compliance by a personal appeal to the parties, but more often he issued an Executive Order to the Navy, the Army, or some other Federal agency, to take over the company involved and operate its plant or facilities until the dispute was fully settled. At first, such seizure of private property was done under the President's broad but vague powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy in time of war. Wherever an order of the NWLB was enforced by this means, an unofficial form of compulsory arbitration was in effect.

In June 1943, Congress passed the War Labor Disputes Act and by its terms strengthened the powers of the NWLB in dispute settlements in two ways: (1) It gave the NWLB the power to subpoena witnesses and records: (2) it expressly empowered the President to seize war plants where production was interrupted or threatened with interruption. In the latter case, the plant was to be operated under the terms and conditions of labor in effect at the time of government take-over, unless some change were authorized by the NWLB. These added powers gave statutory support to the unofficial form of compulsory arbitration used by the Board,

⁵⁵NPD, Paras. 13,531 ff., 13,541 ff., 13,551 ff. Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 477-478. *History of Bu Ships*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chap. 16, pages 14-15, 17-22.

⁵⁶*History of Bu Ships*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chap. 16, pages 4-5.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, page 22.

but such support was clearly limited to war plants.

Against this background, the Navy continued, during the later years of the war, to assist contractors in avoiding or settling labor disputes which threatened to interfere with production of naval materials. As the prospects of Allied victory brightened in 1944 and 1945, labor strife correspondingly increased, and the work of the Navy's Labor Relations Officers, whether in the field, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary, or in the bureaus, became increasingly important. With several years of experience, the work also became increasingly efficient. Its utility has been summarized by an official historian under the following headings:

1. Activity with unions and management of private plants to prevent and cure unrest and strikes. This is where the DLRO's showed much ingenuity, making personal calls, sponsoring monthly luncheons, attending conventions, addressing strike meetings, etc.

2. Liaison to government agencies concerned with wage and hour determinations and with conciliation and mediation. This included recommendations for the relaxation of restrictions on hours and conditions of work, and for speedy processing of dispute cases or voluntary wage cases where the Navy's need for materials was especially urgent.

3. Advice on labor policy to naval officers ordered to seize and operate private plants. At first only the headquarters section, but later also the field service, contributed information and advice to the officers-in-charge.

4. Wage stabilization. Participation in voluntary wage agreements because of the Navy's right to approve allowable costs under cost-plus contracts. Centered in the Office of the Assistant Secretary, operating through the Labor Relations Section.

5. Recommendations concerning the labor

relations of plants considered for Army-Navy "E" awards.⁵⁸

SEIZURE OF CONTRACTING FIRMS

The Navy's machinery for seizure and operation of private plants also became more efficient during the last years of the war.

When an officer had been designated by the Secretary (under an executive order of the President) to take possession of a contractor's property, he would assemble a small staff, usually including advisers in fiscal, legal and labor relations matters, and fly to the plant.

He would then post notices of government possession and confer immediately with representatives of management. If a strike was in progress, the employees would be asked by radio, personal telegrams and phone calls, or newspaper advertisements to return to work, and production would be resumed as soon as a sufficient number of workers was on hand.

The final duty, and often the most difficult, would be the adjustment of the dispute which had brought seizure. Often, this meant enforcing an unpopular ruling of the National War Labor Board—sometimes against a non-compliant management, sometimes against a non-compliant union. Occasionally, the defiant party would hold up enforcement temporarily by seeking aid of the courts. In the end, the ruling would be upheld by the courts and accepted by the non-complying party—at least outwardly.

The primary object of the Navy Department in a seizure case was to obtain efficient production as rapidly as possible and then to turn the property back to its owners and withdraw. Under a ruling of the Attorney General, "productive efficiency" was not considered to have been achieved until a stable working relationship had been established between labor and management by which production could be expected to continue without interruption upon the Navy's retire-

⁵⁸Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 442-443 *et seq.*

ment.⁵⁹ In obtaining this condition, the Navy often insisted not only upon adjusting the basic dispute but in ironing out any petty grievances which had accumulated under the former management. In several cases, this resulted in productive efficiency being not only restored but improved under Navy operation.

The workhorse of Navy seizures was Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Harold G. Bowen, USN, former Chief of the Bureau of Engineering and later Director of the Office of Naval Research, who was named Officer-in-Charge of eight such properties. In every case, he operated under the direct supervision of the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Navy as a "special assistant"—a procedure made necessary by the delicate, semi-political nature of plant take-overs. He was assisted by various persons in the Secretaries' offices, including such legal advisers as Adlai E. Stevenson, H. Struve Hensel, W. John Kenney and W. Randall Compton, and by such labor specialists as Rear Admiral Fisher, Rear Admiral Crisp and Captain Keller.

In 1943-44, the load of seized properties became so heavy that Rear Admiral Bowen devised several methods of distributing the burden while at the same time retaining general supervision of most of the properties.

In the case of three plants seized during 1943 for "management inefficiency", he contracted with well known, private corporations to assume direct charge of operations as "managing agents" under his final control. In this category were: Howarth Pivoted Bearings Co., of Philadelphia (Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., managing agent), Remington Rand, Inc., "N" Division of the Elmira Plant, at Southport, N. Y. (Carl L. Norden, Inc., managing agent);

Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., of San Pedro, California (Todd Shipyards Corp., managing agent). As a further step in the decentralization of control, two of these firms were turned over in June 1944 to the Bureau of Ships, and the other to the Bureau of Ordnance, but in each case the same managing agent was retained and Rear Admiral Bowen was continued as a consultant.

In 1944, Rear Admiral Bowen called upon several other engineering officers, including Commander (later Captain) Harry K. Clark, USNR, and Commander (later Captain) Norman H. Collisson, USNR, to help him administer a number of seized properties. After a period as Rear Admiral Bowen's Executive Officer, each of these officers would be designated "Resident" or "Acting" Officer-in-Charge of a property. Then Rear Admiral Bowen would leave the property and return to Washington to give general supervision to all of his growing collection of seized plants.

In April 1945, Rear Admiral Bowen was transferred to other duties, connected with naval research, and the now experienced Commanders Clark and Collisson relieved him in assuming full responsibility, under the Secretary of the Navy, for the operation of the seized plants. At this time also, the preliminary phase of take-overs, that is, the planning stage prior to issuance of a Presidential executive order, was systematized by the assignment of responsibility for this to a new Office of Emergency Plants Operation. The new office was placed in the charge of the Vice Chief of Procurement and Material (W. John Kenney) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.⁶⁰

It will be noticed that, although the Navy made use of legal, fiscal, and labor-relations experts in every take-over, it designated an engineering officer in each case as the Officer-

⁵⁹Attorney General Biddle, January 14, 1944. Text in *War Labor Reports*, Vol. 13, pages IX-XII; *Opinions of Attorney General*, Vol. 40, No. 77; Bureau of National Affairs, *Labor Relations Reference Manual*, Vol. 12, page 2210.

⁶⁰NPD, Paras. 10,220.1 ff., 10,220.4 ff., 10,220.5 f.

in-Charge. This appears to reflect the Department's emphasis upon the immediate restoration of production as the prime reason for all seizures.

The Navy's biggest seizures operation came when President Truman ordered the taking over of 49 oil refineries and 4 pipe lines by Secretary Forrestal on October 4, 1945, as a result of a nationwide strike.⁶¹ Secretary Forrestal designated Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Ben Moreell, former Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, as Officer-in-Charge. Vice Admiral Moreell named Commander Collisson as his principal deputy and proceeded to establish a "Naval Petroleum Plants Office" with a headquarters in Washington and four district offices located in New York, Chicago, Houston and San Francisco. He personally mediated the dispute between the Oil Workers' International Union (CIO) and the refining companies, and obtained settlements, enabling him to return the properties, several at a time, early in 1946.⁶²

Altogether, the Navy was called upon to take possession of private plants for temporary, emergency operation on fourteen occasions from 1941 to 1945—seven of these as a result of labor disturbances and seven as a result of management's "inefficiency" or "non-cooperation." All of these were "last resort" cases. They were seized only after

⁶¹The seizure of the bituminous-coal mines in May 1946 by the Secretary of the Interior is not treated in this chapter as a Navy seizure, although Secretary Krug named Vice Admiral Ben Moreell as the Coal Mines Administrator, because it reflected policy decisions by the Interior Department rather than the Navy Department.

⁶²A good synopsis of the oil seizures is in National Wage Stabilization Board, *Research and Statistics Report No. 2* (mimeographed, 1946), pages 4-8, 65-67. The Oil Panel's report and recommendations are in Bureau of National Affairs, *Labor Arbitration Reports*, Vol. I, pages 168-189. The records of the Navy Petroleum Plants Office are with the records of the Emergency Plants Operations Section, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in the Navy Records Management Center, Arlington, Va., Job No. 1666. No final report of the Officer-in-Charge was prepared, but daily reports are on file.

every other avenue of possible agreement on terms of production had been carefully explored. A majority were manufacturers of war equipment not coming under either of the industry stabilization programs in which the Navy had participated. There were, however, four seizures of firms affected by the shipbuilding zone agreements—three by the Navy Department and one by the War Shipping Administration. No seizure was necessary in the general construction field.

It may be worthy of note that four of the naval officers who handled these difficult cases of industrial warfare were decorated by the President or the Secretary of the Navy as follows: Vice Admiral Bowen—six commendations and a Distinguished Service Medal (based partly on his services as Chief of the Naval Research Laboratory); Captain Clark—Legion of Merit; Captain Collisson—Legion of Merit, with gold star in lieu of second award; Admiral Moreell—gold star in lieu of second Distinguished Service Medal.

With the ending of hostilities, President Truman hastened to dissolve all labor-relations activities except the permanent adjustment agencies. On August 16, 1945, he issued a statement calling for the National War Labor Board to bring its work to an early conclusion, and thus made further enforcement of NWLB orders virtually impossible against a union or company which chose not to comply.⁶³ On August 25, he issued another order directing the return of all seized properties "as soon as practicable."⁶⁴

In compliance, the NWLB and its Shipbuilding Commission brought their work to a close on December 31, 1945. The Navy, Army, and other agencies operating industrial properties seized prior to VJ-Day hastened to withdraw, whether "productive efficiency" had been restored or not. Military personnel,

⁶³*Termination Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part I, Chaps. 41-42.

⁶⁴Executive Order 9603.

eager to be demobilized after four years of war, were sent home from Navy and Army labor-relations sections within two or three months. The Navy's field service for industrial relations was abolished on August 25.⁶⁵

There were a few exceptions to the general rule of demobilization. In accordance with "the concerned request of industry and labor to continue the stabilization controls over the building and construction industry, which would have expired on December 31, 1945," the NWLB unanimously extended the deadline for the existence of the Wage Adjustment Board to an indefinite time in the future.⁶⁶ Hence the WAB did continue to function during the reconversion period until February 24, 1947.⁶⁷

Although the Navy terminated its Office of Procurement and Materials on August 20, 1945, it set up in its place a permanent Materials Division, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary, with similar duties.⁶⁸ In this Division, the old Labor Relations Section and Emergency Plants Operations Section were retained. The former was soon de-activated (November) and the latter only continued because of Navy operation of the refineries and oil pipe-lines. Nevertheless, the wartime value of these agencies appeared to be recognized. Whether this would still be remembered later, when another national emergency arose, remained to be seen.

CONCLUSIONS

The following represent the principal conclusions from this study:

1. The Navy has been partially unprepared to handle labor relations problems among its contractors at the outbreak of each of two world wars. This has been due, apparently, to two erroneous assumptions:

a. *That civilian mediation agencies are adequate to assure the armed forces of a flow of war supplies uninterrupted by labor disputes.* Actually, the effectiveness of these agencies depends upon the degree of cooperation received from employers, unions and employees. The agencies must look to other branches of the government for support whenever it becomes necessary to enforce compliance with their policies against any party which takes an unyielding stand against them. In peace time, such agencies look to the courts for enforcement of their awards. In wartime, judicial remedies usually are too slow and must be supplemented by the temporary expedient of government seizure and operation. This remedy should, therefore, be available to the President as well as the right to seek court injunctions. In cases of seizure, the armed forces generally have proved more effective and impartial than civilian agencies in obtaining compliance.

b. *That the Navy never has, and never should, intervene in disputes between contractors and their employees.* This is both untrue and ambiguous. The Navy often has, and should continue to, intervene where either management or labor is acting in contravention of law or of established procedure; or where the presentation of information to both sides would facilitate mutual understanding. What the Navy should avoid is prejudice against either side or unfairness of any sort; but it should not hesitate to uphold the law and orderly procedure where production of essential military goods is interrupted by illegal and irregular methods.

2. Labor Relations Officers, in the naval districts and at Navy procurement headquarters in Washington, have shown in two world wars that they can reduce unrest and strikes among the employees of Navy contractors and so speed the flow of war supplies.

⁶⁵NPD, Para. 13,501a.

⁶⁶*Termination Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 1203.

⁶⁷Dunlop and Hill, *The Wage Adjustment Board, op. cit.*

⁶⁸NPD, Paras. 10,141a ff., espec. 10,149.2a.

They have done this, without prejudice against either unions or management. They have relied on three processes: reporting, preventing, and curing labor controversies.

a. *Reporting.* The prompt reporting of labor disputes to the Office of the Secretary and the cognizant bureaus is as important as the collection of production statistics. In cases of strikes, plans for the procuring of supplies from alternate sources, and for the rerouting of parts and materials, must be made. And if seizure is contemplated, posters must be printed and a staff assembled in advance of the President's order so that possession may be taken immediately upon the President's announcement.

b. *Prevention.* Labor relations officers do not and, should not, intervene as to the contents of union-management contracts, but they can insist upon observance of those contracts by both sides and upon arbitration of any disputes over their meaning. They can urge a continuance of production during collective bargaining over a new contract. They can recommend or oppose change in state or federal rulings regarding hours of work in particular areas. They can urge mediation bodies to give priority to the hearing of especially urgent or meritorious cases, but should avoid crying "wolf" too often.

c. *Cure.* Labor relations officers have addressed mass meetings of employees at which they knew strike votes were to be taken, and have persuaded the men to vote against the strike. The Navy has supplied protection for civilian workers as well as supplied its own personnel to help break strikes which were in violation of orders of the National War Labor Board or in defiance of contract terms as interpreted by the national leaders of the unions involved. It has taken over plants from defiant management and removed the officers

of the company from control of operations while it enforced wage rulings of the NWLB costing the management hundreds of thousands of dollars. But it has intervened in such fashion, solely to avoid shutdowns of vitally needed production, and it has acted solely at the written order of the President in execution of policies determined by civil authority. It has operated such plants with evident consideration for the rights of all interested parties, including the owners, the employees, the unions, the suppliers, the insurers,—and the customers, the Navy. It has returned such plants as soon as possible and in at least as good condition as when it took possession.

3. The Navy is properly concerned with the welfare of three types of employees: military personnel, civilian personnel and contractors' employees. They are all human beings, and their welfare and productive efficiency involve many common problems.⁶⁹ Their efficiency is vital to an adequate supply of naval material in wartime. Nevertheless, each class is in a different relationship to the Secretary of the Navy and requires different handling. Military personnel are disciplined according to an historic pattern. Employees of naval shipyards come under civil service, whereas the contractors' employees come under social security. The labor relations of the contractors are so intimately related to procurement of naval equipment as to suggest the assignment of a labor relations section for contractors' employees permanently within the procurement office (currently the Office of Naval Material).

⁶⁹The parallel between military and civilian relationships is interestingly drawn by CDR Joseph L. Miller, USNR, in "The Navy Has No Foremen's Problem," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1950 (Volume 76), pages 265-267. Labor relations with the Navy's civilian personnel are treated in Lieutenant John J. Collins, USNR, "Labor Relations and the Navy," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1943 (Volume 69) pages 703-710; and Ordway, *op. cit.*, especially chapter 17, "Employee Relations and Services" (Volume II).

4. Seizures by the Navy Department involve matters of such high policy and require such delicate balancing of the interests of labor, management, and the government as to call for the most direct supervision by the Office of the Secretary. This has been the practice in the past, one that has proven eminently successful. Orders from the Secretary of the Navy have been given directly to the Officer-in-Charge, never via any intermediate command. This is especially necessary because the Secretary himself is acting in behalf of the President and is directly and personally responsible for the conduct of the seizure operation. Provision should be made for easy and immediate liaison between the Officer-in-Charge at the seized plant and the Secretary or Under Secretary in Washington. In the past, this has been facilitated by the legal aides in the Secretary's office with apparent success.

5. The ancient controversy over civilian and military power has its echo in labor relations during wars and national emergencies. In World War II, the principal clashes were over wage-stabilization policy and union security. In a republic, however, the roles of the two authorities are clearly defined: The civil *makes* national policy, and the military *enforces* it, without fear or favor. Where this is understood and accepted, conflicts can be ironed out. For example:

a. *Wage stabilization policy.* It is the exclusive function of the civil authority to consider the host of political and economic pressures centering about war-time wage control, and to arrive at some resolution of the various forces. This is so because the civil authority compromises, the military does not. The civil agencies decide on wage, price and taxation policies from the standpoint of their probable effects upon the standard of living and upon the problems of the postwar period as well as upon immediate combat effectiveness. It is the

function of the military to present the case for combat effectiveness as persuasively as possible, but to recognize that the armed forces are but one of the many pressure groups who must be heard. If the civil agencies are slow to introduce wage stabilization, as they were in two world wars, the armed forces may do so, temporarily, by agreement with the contractors and the unions in particular industries.

b. *Union security.* Uniformity of policy is desirable in wartime as a means of eliminating controversies other than with the enemy. The civil authorities, therefore, seek compromises on outstanding issues which they believe will be acceptable, although not palatable, to all patriotic citizens. In two world wars, the National War Labor Board has adopted such a compromise on the question of union security and called upon all employers and unions to accept it. In the first war, it was the open shop, with non-discrimination against union membership. In the second, it was maintenance of union membership, with escape clauses to permit periodic resignations. In a few cases, the military authorities were called upon to enforce this policy against unwilling employers. Neither the Secretary of the Navy nor any naval officer can properly set himself up above the civil authority in such a matter and determine whether or not to enforce the national policy; but that policy should be clearly set forth by the President in writing for the guidance of the enforcement agency.

6. The Navy has participated in voluntary efforts to reduce labor turnover by standardization of wages in the shipbuilding and general construction industries. It has taken part in both bipartite and tripartite forms of collective bargaining in these industries, i.e. it has negotiated agreements with the unions alone and with representatives of the unions and employers jointly. In all these activities,

it has acted in coordination with other government procurement agencies. The following conclusions are suggested by these experiences:

a. The tripartite form of organization is better than the bipartite, i.e. the experience and advice of the employers has proven highly useful in setting wages in these distinctive industries, and such representation also has aided in obtaining compliance by the employers.

b. Government representation on such boards should not be split between two different types of agency. Such representation should either be entirely from the procurement concerned with national stabilization (anti-inflation) policies, but not from both. Where the board is concerned simply with reducing turnover in a single industry, representatives of the procurement agencies

probably are most useful; but where the board is concerned with applying national wage-and-price-control (anti-inflation) policies, civilians having no other governmental affiliations are the most impartial and effective. In the latter case, close liaison with the procurement agencies is highly desirable.

c. Reimbursement of contractors for wage changes determined by such boards should be made automatically, if the procurement agencies are members of the boards. If the agencies are not members, but are allowed effective liaison in order to present relevant information and opinions, reimbursement under cost-plus contracts should be virtually automatic if not so technically. This is a matter of good faith.

EDITORIAL NOTES

FROM time to time, after an issue has been sent to the printer, items relating to disparate topics remain on the editor's desk, simply because there was a lack of space or a lack of time to place them in an appropriate spot. Here, then, are a few such items:

- The next luncheon meeting of the American Military Institute will be devoted to the announcement of and the ceremonies in connection with the biennial Moncado Book Fund award. This year's award is worth \$200 to the lucky and able winner, and the grapevine has it that three manuscripts in particular are racing to a photo-finish. The meeting is scheduled for Thursday noon, 26 May 1955, at the Naval Gun Factory Officers Club, Washington, D. C..

- It does not seem possible, always, to stop for a moment and make an appreciative bow to the various individuals and institutions that contribute aid and comfort in the

matter of keeping AMI and its journal, *Military Affairs*, successful going concerns. It is desired at this time to acknowledge, with thanks, the following contributions:

- That of F. W. Foster Gleason, for systematically promoting the microfilming of past volumes of *Military Affairs*, and supervising to completion this highly useful and necessary project;

- That of Howard I. Shaw and Rowland Gill, for the time-consuming, sometimes vexatious, but always vitally important job of handling the subscription and membership accounts of the American Military Institute; and,

- That of the *Combat Forces Journal*, for the convenience of their mailing address and other professional courtesies; and, particularly, to N. P. Anthony of the *Journal* staff, for compiling the index to Volume XVII of *Military Affairs*.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE UNITED STATES ARMY'S HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II*

BY M. C. HELFERS
Lt. Colonel, USA Ret.

ONE of the noticeable signs that the United States is assuming the responsibilities of a major military power is the unprecedented emphasis which its military services have given to obtaining a reliable history of their performances in World War II. If one discounts such documentary series as the well known *Records of the War of Rebellion*, one is faced with the fact that none of the services has ever published an official history of any of the wars in which it has been engaged. The story is entirely different for World War II.

The United States Army has undertaken a historical program which calls for the publication of some ninety volumes on its activities and operations in World War II. These ninety-odd volumes will be increased to almost a hundred when the authorized seven of *The Army Air Forces in World War II* are published.¹ The United States Navy's historical program calls for fourteen semi-official volumes, eight of which have been published.² The United States Marine Corps, in a program quite independent of the Navy's, has

published fourteen of an intended fifteen historical studies of Marine Corps activities and operations.³ While the Navy's and the Air Force's program is directed somewhat toward the popularization of military history, the Army's is very much in line with the form and content of *Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918*, and the *History of the Great War* by the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defense, Great Britain.

The United States Army's World War II historical program is the result of much planning and thought during the latter part of the war. A recommendation, based on this planning and thought, was submitted to the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 December 1945, by Major General E. F. Harding, at that time Director, Historical Division, War Department. This recommendation, substantially the program now in effect, was approved. For over a year the necessary funds to insure completion of the program by professional historians were lacking. These funds were obtained on 23 June 1947 when the Secretary of War approved a recommendation submitted by the successor of General Harding, Major General Harry J. Malony, to set aside four million dollars from the wartime profits of the Army Post Exchange Service for the purpose of establishing a non-appropriated historical fund. It has been one of the main tasks of the

*The views of two professional historians on this subject are in Kent Roberts Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954), pp. 3-14, and in Hugh M. Cole, "Writing Contemporary Military History," *Military Affairs*, XII, (fall 1948), pp. 162-167.

¹Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Gate, editors, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948) Five volumes have been published.

²Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947)

³Official historical studies prepared by Historical Division, U. S. Marine Corps (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947)

present Chief of Military History, Major General A. C. Smith, and his predecessor, Major General Orlando Ward, to administer this fund in such a way that the program can be completed.

The U.S. Army in World War II, as now envisaged, will consist of eighteen volumes on high-level over-all topics, such as the organization and planning of the War Department, global strategy and logistics, and numerous problems of the home front; thirty-three theater volumes in which operations are being set forth in detail and in their strategic context;⁴ twenty-four volumes on the activities of the various technical services—the Transportation, Quartermaster, Signal, Chemical, and Medical Corps, the Corps of Engineers, and the Ordnance Department; and fifteen volumes on special subjects, such as the Women's Army Corps, Negro troops, French armament, pictorial histories, and selected small unit actions. Volumes dealing entirely with chronology, order of battle, and statistics are to be included. The final volume will be a master index of the entire series.

In recent years the following 22 volumes (listed in order of their publication) have appeared in print:

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
The Lorraine Campaign
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Cross-Channel Attack
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial Record)
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial Record)

⁴Ten of the theater volumes will deal with the European Theater, six with the Mediterranean Theater, eleven with the Pacific Theater, three with the China-Burma-India Theater, two with the American Theater, and one with the Middle East Theater.

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The War Against Japan (Pictorial Record)
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Approach to the Philippines
Stilwell's Mission to China
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services (Vol. I)
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare
Fall of the Philippines
Logistical Support of the Armies in ETO, Volume I
The Supreme Command
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

Scheduled for publication before the end of this year are *Leyte: Return to the Philippines* and *The Women's Army Corps*. Latest estimates based on the number of volumes printed or in the printer's hands, undergoing review in manuscript, or currently being written indicate that the entire project is about seventy percent completed. Research and writing, however, is about eighty-five percent complete. At the rate of present progress, 1958 should see just about all volumes of the *U.S. Army in World War II* on the shelf.

The chart below illustrates graphically the chronological coverage of the various theater volumes.

The actual writing of the history is in the hands of the best available talent, both civilian and military. Whenever possible, a professional historian has been chosen as the author or co-author of each volume. Such scholars in American history as Drs. Hugh M. Cole, Gordon A. Harrison, and Louis Morton have volumes in the series. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, from 1930 to 1942 Chairman of the Department of History in the Johns Hopkins University, has served as Chief Historian and adviser to the Chief of Military History since the program began. Almost all of the authors, including the Chief Historian, served on staffs or with troops during the war, many of them on historical assignments. An advisory committee, appointed by the Secretary of the Army and

CHRONOLOGICAL COVERAGE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THEATER VOLUMES

	1939	1940	1941 <i>U.S. Army in World War II: The Theater Volumes</i>	1942	1943	1944	1945 <i>U.S. Army in World War II: The Theater Volumes</i>
CBI THEATER							
I. Stilwell's Mission to China							
II. Command Problems							
III. Administrative Problems							
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER							
I. Operations: Northwest Africa							
II. Sicily: Surrender of Italy							
III. Salerno to Cassino							
IV. The Campaign in Southern Italy							
V. Advance to the Alps							
VI. Administrative and Logistical History: MTO							
PACIFIC THEATER							
I. The Fall of the Philippines							
II. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive							
III. Victory in Papua							
IV. CARRYOVER: The Reduction of Rabaul							
V. The Struggle for the Gilberts and Marshalls							
VI. Campaign in the Marianas							
VII. The Approach to the Philippines							
VIII. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines							
IX. Luzon and the Southern Philippines							
X. Okinawa: The Last Battle							
XI. Strategy, Command, and Administration							
EUROPEAN THEATER							
I. Cross Channel Attack							
II. Breakout and Pursuit							
III. The Lorraine Campaign							
IV. Siegfried Line Campaign							
V. The Ardennes							
VI. The Last Offensive							
VII. Logistical Support of the Armies - I							
VIII. Logistical Support of the Armies - II							
IX. The Supreme Command							
X. Southern France and Alsace							
MIDDLE EAST THEATER							
I. The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia							
AMERICAN THEATER							
I. The Framework of Hemisphere Defense							
II. Guarding the United States and Its Outposts							

Shaded areas indicate published volumes

consisting of distinguished civilian historians and representatives from the United States Military Academy and the higher Army service colleges, meets yearly as a sort of board of trustees or board of visitors to assist, advise, and guide the Chief of Military History and the Chief Historian.⁵ Members of this committee also take part in the prepublication review of some volumes. It can thus be seen that the program, while sponsored and administered by the Department of the Army, is actually being carried out by civilians who possess the necessary ability and experience to make the *U.S. Army in World War II* a monument of historical research and writing. Few scholarly works are based on more extensive research, more searching evaluation of the facts, more careful writing, and wider prepublication review than the volumes of this history. Not a single published volume has had an unfavorable review. The *New York Times* has declared: "[The volumes] are examples of military objectivity." A historian, writing for the *American Historical Review*, has referred to the series as "truth seeking . . . on a large scale and in the public interest."—The aim approved by the Chief of Staff is military history "written without the suppression or distortion of significant facts."—Hanson W. Baldwin called *Stilwell's Mission to China* "revealing and outspoken" and stated: "Impartial history . . . has a way of rectifying errors, and this book . . . provides a much-needed corrective and places our China errors in proper perspective." A chapter from *The Fall of the Philippines* is among the selections from the writings of 32 eminent modern historians in Edward N. Saveth's recently published treasury of American historical writing, *Understanding the American Past*. In France, General Lestien in the *Revue de la deuxième*

guerre mondiale recently described the published volumes of the *U.S. Army in World War II* as a genuine "examination of conscience." In England, General J. F. C. Fuller wrote of *Cross-Channel Attack*:

In this new volume of the *United States Army in World War II* is described with clarity and impartiality what its author rightly acclaims to be "the supreme effort of the Western Allies in Europe."

And Captain Cyril Falls writing of *The Lorraine Campaign* as the first volume in the European subseries observed:

If the rest proves as good it will be excellent. . . . A mark of good military history is that, while the enemy's situation may be described more briefly than that of one's own side, it should be equally clear. Here this need has been amply met.

The last sentence by Captain Cyril Falls touches on a unique feature of the undertaking. This unique feature, appreciated especially by the historian, is a by-product of the capture of the enemy's military records and of the prolonged incarceration of all former enemy generals and general staff officers after the cessation of hostilities, which led to an unprecedented participation by the "other" side in the writing of the *U.S. Army in World War II*.⁶ Over four hundred manuscripts were written for the program by former Japanese officers on their military operations against the United States. The contribution by former German officers is even greater. In *The Lorraine Campaign* Dr. Cole cites in his footnotes no less than eighty manuscripts written by former German officers. Answers to questions submitted by the author to key German commanders are also cited. This, by no means, includes all the manuscripts and answered questionnaires which the author used or the great mass of captured German documents he consulted. In writing *Cross-Channel Attack* Dr. Harrison made as extensive a use of ma-

⁵In the past such noted historians as Henry S. Commager, James P. Baxter, and Douglas Southall Freeman have served on the Advisory Committee.

⁶In some cases draft chapters on German operations have even been subjected to prepublication review by German participants.

terial written after the war by former German officers. Of the some 1,200 footnotes found in this volume, approximately 430 are from German sources: Of these 280 are from captured German documents and 150 are from postwar narratives written by former German officers. The importance and value of this German contribution to the *U.S. Army in World War II* is very effectively brought out by Dr. Cole in his "Bibliographical Note" at the end of *The Lorraine Campaign*. There he writes:

Enemy information derived from contemporary documents has been augmented by approximately one thousand manuscript histories written after the war by German officers in Germany under the direction of Col. H. E. Potter, USA. This collection, to which additions on the later phases of the war in Europe are still being made, is in the possession of the Historical Division. Although these manuscripts depend almost entirely on unaided memories of their writers, they add immeasurably to our knowledge of the enemy operations. When checked against German Army documents and Allied sources, the manuscripts show an amazing degree of accuracy and objectivity. . . .

Participation in the program by the former enemy has not only made the Army's task easier and the results more complete but has also been a noteworthy impetus to the writing of military history in Japan and Germany. The Japanese are already writing their own official history of the war, and one of Germany's leading post-war military historians, Professor Walther Hubatsch of Goettingen, has stated recently that "the German memoir literature written since 1945 is remarkably full of matter and diverse." This is due in no small degree to the encouragement to write given to former enemy officers by the

Army's historical agencies in Germany and Japan.

If, as every writer on American military policy points out, the United States Army has repeated costly mistakes of the past each time it has engaged in a major war, then the volumes of the *U.S. Army in World War II* should help considerably to correct this. The *U.S. Army in World War II* might best be characterized as a major work of reference on the Army's effort in that war such has never before been readily available to military students, staff officers, and commanders. Where previously the U.S. military planner, searching for an important precedent or an accurate description of how a problem was handled in the past, was forced to search through masses of retired files and unofficial literature, so far as World War II is concerned he need turn only to the green volumes on the shelf of every higher headquarters, including the White House, and read what happened back in the late '30's and the first half of the '40's.

The *U.S. Army in World War II* is also of value to others than the military. Although the writer does not consider himself qualified to speak for the historical profession in general, it would appear that the influence of the military upon modern life has been so great in recent years that the historian who still refuses to take an interest in military history is neglecting the basic mission of his profession, the interpretation of the past on the basis of all the relevant facts. The greatest value of *U.S. Army in World War II* may well be its contribution to a balanced history of the United States.

MILITARY HISTORY COURSE AT GEORGETOWN

A summer course on *Current Problems in American Foreign and Military Policy* will be given at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., June 20-July 30, 1955 by Dr. James D. Atkinson. The class will meet four evenings each week. For details write to Office of the Summer School, Georgetown University.

A LITTLE KNOWN PERIOD OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

BY CLARENCE C. CLENDENEN

Can anybody give a logical answer to the question, "Why do most writers on American military history assume that it started with the assembly of the New England militia before Boston, in the spring of 1775?" The long period during which the American colonies were an integral part of the British Empire is usually overlooked entirely by writers on the subject of military history. If it is mentioned at all, it is treated briefly, as "background."

Yet the fact remains that the colonial force which assembled after Lexington and Concord was the product of a century and a half of development and evolution, and was the result of a definitely established military tradition and practice. The spring of 1775 did not mark the first time that colonial military forces had assembled independently of any stimulus from the Mother Country, nor was George Washington the first American to command in battle an American force. Every war fought in Europe during the hundred and fifty odd years since the establishment of the first English settlements on the Atlantic seaboard had had repercussions in America. And not only were the American colonies at war each time that Great Britain was at war, they fought numerous savage little wars against the Indians on their own authority. The years of the colonial era were years of almost ceaseless war, in some part or another, of North America.

Probably few present day readers of American military history are familiar with the names of Phineas Lyman or Sir William Pepperrell, but both of them commanded American forces as large, or nearly as large, as the forces under Washington. Phineas Lyman was in command of the provincial

forces in New York, during the later years of the French and Indian War, and made herculean efforts to wield his colonials into effective soldiers. William Pepperrell commanded, successfully, the amphibious expedition organized by the New England colonies for the capture of the French stronghold of Louisburg. It was an enterprise that could not possibly be successful, but the French surrendered!

Lyman and Pepperrell, as well as a score of other colonial soldiers, made the army that assembled after Lexington and Concord possible. If Washington is the father of the American military tradition, they are certainly entitled to be considered as its grandfathers.

As early as 1636, forces separate and distinct from the local militia were raised in New England for the war against the Pequods. In 1690 a Massachusetts-Connecticut force commanded by Sir William Phips (the first American-born Royal Governor, and the first American to be knighted), captured Port Royal, and made a determined, and unsuccessful attack on Quebec itself. It was not until eighty years later that British forces next sighted Quebec. In 1704 a Massachusetts force under Major Benjamin Church ravaged the coasts of Nova Scotia. (Church had previously commanded four Massachusetts expeditions against the French and Indians in what is now Maine.) In 1702 a South Carolina force invaded Florida and captured St. Augustine, but were unable to reduce the fort because of the lack of artillery. Exactly forty years later the new colony of Georgia signalled its entrance into the colonial military scene by another invasion of Florida, commanded by James Oglethorpe himself.

These instances could be multiplied a hundred times. The army that assembled after the Battle of Lexington was a replica of the colonial forces that had been assembling almost annually for many years. It had all of

their weaknesses, and it had all of their elements of strength. The American army and the American military tradition had existed a long time before 1775.

McCLELLAN'S HISTORY OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS*

TO date there are only three published general histories of the Marine Corps worthy of the name history; M. Almy Aldrich, *History of the United States Marine Corps* (Boston: Shepard, 1875); Richard S. Collum, *History of the United States Marine Corps* (Philadelphia: Hamersly, 1890); and Clyde H. Metcalf, *History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Putnam, 1939). Of these the second draws liberally, at times, verbatim from the first, while the third is based in large part upon Edwin N. McClellan's unpublished *History of the United States Marine Corps*.

In the 1920's, McClellan (at the time a Major, and later a Lieutenant Colonel) as Officer-in-charge of the Historical Section, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, projected a seven volume history. When the project was set up, it was to have constituted the official history of the Corps. As time passed and personnel changed, McClellan's work never progressed beyond the first volume and parts of the second, and never got beyond the stage of mimeographed editions of individual chapters put out in editions of two hundred copies. Most of these chapters were distributed to service libraries and interested individuals. A few copies, however, found their way into public libraries where, due to the unorthodox nature of publication, they usually came to rest among uncatalogued collectanea.

Incomplete and sketchy though it is, McClellan's *History* comes the closest to being an authoritative history of the Marine Corps.

However, McClellan's is the only one of the general histories of the Corps which makes any attempt at documentation. Although at times he is uncritical in his use of material, McClellan indicates in his voluminous notes that he has relied heavily on the most reliable sources both primary and secondary. He is the only one of the general histories to have made any recognizable use of Marine Corps archives. In several of the chapters which were never put into narrative form McClellan confined himself to "material and sources" compilations which in themselves constitute a ready stepping stone to any further research on these subjects. As it stands, McClellan's *History* is indispensable to the student of the early Marine Corps.

The New York Public Library has now made McClellan's *History* available by assembling and microfilming the chapters that were issued. A positive copy of the microfilm may be obtained from The Library's Photoduplication Division for 25.00. The microfilm includes a Checklist of the published portions of McClellan's *History* prepared by the Marine Corps Historical Branch.

*Contributed by C. E. Dornbusch who ascribes authorship to Rowland P. Gill and others, Historical Section, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

United States Army in World War II. The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces. By John D. Millett. (Office of the Chief of Military History; Department of the Army: Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 494; Illustrated; Index. \$4.25.)

Histories, broadly speaking, can be arranged in a broad spectrum at the extremes of which may be found, on the one hand, the dry-as-dust tomes of the professional devotees of Clio and, on the other, the much livelier now-it-can-be-told accounts prepared by the participants in the events described. Each variety has its own merits; the objectivity and balance which are the aims of the one may be offset by the special knowledge, insight and "feeling" for the subject which often characterize the other. Sometimes we are fortunate in having a happy blending of the two—the kind of a volume the author of the present study might have written but didn't. *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces* is not in many respects a scholarly monograph, despite its many scholarly qualities, but it nonetheless makes a valuable contribution to the series in which it is published. Well organized and written with clarity and even, where the materials permit, with spirit, it describes the role in World War II of the top-level logistics organization of the Army, called at first the Services of Supply but later named the Army Service Forces. Successive parts describe the organization of the War Department and Army in 1942 which gave birth to the Army Service Forces; the role and functioning of Army Service Forces within the War Department; Army Service Forces' relationships with the civilian war agencies concerned with economic mobilization—especially War Production Board; and organizational

relationships and changes within the Army Service Forces.

The author is a political scientist of standing, with a background of academic achievement and practical experience in administration. During much of World War II, he served as an officer with the Army Service Forces in a staff position near the apex of the hierarchic pyramid. Here he was equally well situated for observing the larger operations of the Army Service Forces and for absorbing the institutional bias of the agency which postwar reflection evidently has not materially weakened. Colonel Millett is a strong, though not uncritical, admirer of the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, the able, aggressive and controversial Brehon B. Somervell, who occupies the spotlight in many of the chapters and whose presence is felt in all.

If any of the war-spawned agencies, military or civilian, was loved, it was not the Army Service Forces, its role being as unwelcome to many of the bureaus of the War Department as its policies were disliked by some agencies outside the military establishment. There were major controversies within the War Department, especially with the key Operations Division (OPD) of the General Staff, and with the Army Air Forces; and outside the War Department, particularly with the War Production Board. So far as the War Production Board - Army Service Forces, Nelson - Somervell conflict is concerned, this volume supplies much fuel and heat and some illumination. It is doubtful if the further documentary elaboration of the case by participants in the controversy, respecting the now rather threadbare issue of who was trying to do what to whom, will do much to clarify the course of events in this significant area of civil-military relations.

One of the most valuable parts of this study are the chapters dealing with discordant relations between the Army Service Forces, as personified by General Somervell, and OPD, the vital strategic planning center of the War Department. Here much light is thrown upon the crucial relationships between strategy and logistics. OPD, reflecting the traditional attitude of command toward supply, was inclined to regard logistics as the lowly hand-maiden to strategy. Supply should speak when spoken to, providing when requested such technical information and advice as the strategic planners might desire. General Somervell rejected this conception of the role of the logistical arm, insisting not only upon a close coordination of strategic and logistic planning but also a continuous participation of supply in the strategic councils, with something approaching equality of status for supply. Although he met defeat on a number of specific issues, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, did compel a far greater recognition of the importance of supply than hitherto had been accorded. The close coordination of strategic and logistic planning in the structure of the postwar military establishment undoubtedly reflects the influence of the dynamic figure who at times so importunately insisted on a place in the strategic sun during World War II.

Within the framework of the author's viewpoint, this volume provides not only an intimate and interesting account of the activities and policies of the Army Service Forces' Commanding General but also an extraordinarily clear and readable account of top-level interagency relationships and of the organizational structure, problems and evolution of the Army Service Forces. In these respects it represents a very substantial contribution to our understanding of a major segment of the tremendous task of supplying our armed forces in World War II. In one important respect, however, the treatment falls short of what might reasonably be expected. The focus of attention upon the personality, activities and policies of the Commanding General and upon high level relationships generally has the unhappy result of thrusting other and equally significant, if lower level, matters into the background.

This is especially true of the relationships between headquarters, Army Service Forces, and the technical services (Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal Corps, etc.) which performed the tremendous tasks of developing, procuring and distributing the vast quantities of equipment and supplies re-

quired to equip and maintain the ground and, in part, air forces. (Incidentally, the accomplishment of these tasks, summarized in an early chapter, is presented as an achievement of the Army Service Forces, without so much as a mention of the technical services which performed them). These relationships were at the core of the mission of the Army Service Forces and yet they are disposed of in an almost perfunctory manner, with less than two chapters of the twenty-four devoted to them. The treatment, while suggestive, is hardly adequate, compelling the reader who desires further light on these matters to turn to the many volumes which deal with army supply at the technical service level. Here he may find what he is looking for but only at the cost of much time and effort. From the consumer's viewpoint, the layer-and-slice method of writing history, employed so extensively in this series, has decided disadvantages.

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The China Tangle. By Herbert Feis. (Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. 430, index. \$6.00.)

Stillwell's Mission to China. By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953. Pp. 397, glossary and index. \$5.50.)

The mass of books and articles dealing with the China Policy of the United States during the war years and the pre Red China post war era has now reached the wearisome magnitude when one wonders if the point will ever be reached when everything that can be written or said on the subject has been presented to a long suffering public. Perhaps no other topic since the end of World War II has been the subject of so much controversy; so many statements and misstatements, facts and opinions or so many interpretations as this one. Now Herbert Feis adds more of the same to the already staggering and confused documentation.

China Tangle purports to be the story of American Policy in China 1941-1946, written with "illumination and impartiality" after extensive research in the original records of the State Department and the individuals concerned. Further, the publishers claim "there is new and extended information" within its covers. This reviewer does not question the access to original records and documents but he is doubtful of the newness of the material and in frank contradiction to the

"illumination and impartiality" of the piece.

The reader is left somewhat up in the air as to whether Mr. Feis is pro, anti, or neutral to the Vincent-Service-Lattimore theories but the reviewer gets the distinct impression that the author leans a little more than slightly in the pro-direction.

Feis studies the situation from Pearl Harbor to the beginning of the Marshall Mission, picking his way through the complex pictures of the Stillwell Mission, the Wallace Mission, the Cairo and the Teheran Conference, the Wedemeyer era, Yalta, the Hurley episodes, Potsdam and terminating with a cryptic chapter entitled "Marshall Is Instructed."

The reviewer gains the distinct impression throughout the book that this is another attempt to explain and justify the policy employed during this critical era. In light of subsequent events this is a bit difficult to understand. Many of its heroes are those who have been subsequently condemned or censured; those who occupy the role of villains in the book have been castigated in other writings published prior to *China Tangle*, and subsequently vindicated in part or entirely.

It is significant that *China Tangle* has as its concluding thought a device used in other books purporting to be impartial on issues of American Policy that have become submerged in the "you did - I didn't" type of post-policy wrangling. It reflects the "they probably meant well" reasoning which was used to gloss over our Vichy fiasco and similar incidents. It frankly admits "In retrospect, we may have done less in and for China while the war for Europe was being fought out than we might safely and wisely have done. We thought we were only deferring the greater aid until that part of the world-wide struggle against tyranny was won." Typical of the apologia, Feis appeals to the judgment of history; "Nor should we this soon conclude that a better appreciation of what we sought to do with China will not emerge out of the debris of hatred and regret which have silted over it."

China Tangle is well written and as such is a contribution to the question. It should be read and digested carefully. Better still, it should be read in conjunction with the Romanus-Sunderland offering, *Stillwell's Mission to China*, an official volume in the U. S. Army in World War II series. This latter volume, frequently cited by Feis, provides all the detail omitted in *China Tangle* and, while it covers only a part of the era discussed by Feis, it covers it so well that the two make excellent contrasting reading. Where *China*

Tangle concentrates on the political aspects, the Romanus-Sunderland book presents the military picture in admirable fashion, generously documented and can be considered a valid and valuable contribution to history. It represents an almost day by day account of what actually happened during Stillwell's tenure of office. It definitely does a much better job of setting the stage for the Feis book than does Feis himself and if read in conjunction with *China Tangle*, should probably be read first.

In *Stillwell's Mission* there is no attempt to explain, analyze, apologize or editorialize and opinions and interpretations of the writers are kept to a minimum. It has an authoritative ring that gains the confidence of the reader without beating down his own personal views on the subject. This gives the impression of being a recounting of fact, which it obviously is.

Military readers may not lose by not reading *China Tangle* but to miss *Stillwell's Mission* would be to pass up a fine piece of military writing and a valuable source book on Far East affairs.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
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Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War. By George E. Turner. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1953. Pp. xiv, 419. \$4.50.)

To the "heaviest battalions" of Voltaire the American Civil War added a new decisive factor in warfare—railroads. By 1861 the spreading rails had so altered the economic relations between Northeast and Northwest as to affect materially their political alignment against secession. The existence and location of railroads played a major part in determining the shape and pattern of the war which ensued. And, finally, victory went to the side which had the better network of rails and was better able to maintain and operate not only its own lines but those it took from the enemy.

Earlier military writers, however, being intensely interested in tactics and movements on the battlefields, tended to overlook such mundane affairs as how armies came to the place of battle, how they were supplied after they got there, and how the productive capacities of the nation behind them were utilized and sustained. There were a few writers who paid attention to the transportation services without which none of these things could have been accomplished—notably, General Haupt

who wrote of what was done in the East and Generals Sherman and McCallum who wrote of achievements in the West. But for the most part it has remained for later writers to deal with the railroad as a new fact of geography and a vital factor in the course and outcome of the War between the States.

Among the earliest to recognize explicitly that "railways meant more than mountain-ranges and scarcely less than the great rivers in determining the lines of advance and defense" and that interpretation of military operations in relation to the rail lines was "the soundest possible approach to the strategy of the war," was Douglas Southall Freeman, writing in 1936. Since then, the study of the subject has been enriched by such works as those of Summers on the Baltimore & Ohio, Kamm on the Pennsylvania, Charles W. Turner on the Virginia lines, and Sutton on the Illinois Central. More broadly, Weber has written *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War* and Black, *The Railroads of the Confederacy*, both published in 1952, while the work under review was being finished.

Mr. Turner did not have the advantage of seeing these admirable books but his work, nevertheless, fulfills excellently a different purpose, dealing with the railroads of both sides and being concerned, as it is, not so much with the effect of the war upon railroads as of the railroads upon the war.

It is possible to disagree with the vigor of Mr. Turner's castigation of the policy of the Confederate government toward its railroads for, after all, these railroads did enable the South to maintain four years of unequal struggle. But it is easy to agree with his summation:

"The projection of locomotives into warfare disproved the thesis that victory must come to the side with the bravest men. . . . The first year of the war made it apparent to some and should have made it obvious to all that, regardless of all other factors involved, mobility was of prime importance. It should have been equally clear to all that mobility of men, munitions and supplies depended in large measure on the railroads."

And, it might be added, it is as true today as it was in 1861 that mobility depends at bottom, upon the economy of manpower, fuel and materials inherent in mass movement in trains of cars on tracks.

ROBERT S. HENRY
Alexandria, Virginia.

Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945. Volume II, Clinical Subjects. Edited by W. R. Feasby. Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1953. Pp. 537. \$5.00.

This book is one of a series of similar histories of the activities of the medical services of the Allied Powers in World War II which are now in the process of being prepared and issued by the various governments involved. As such they may be considered as indispensable reference works on the shelves of military as well as medical historians. The day has long passed when the military historian can hope to give an adequate account of a war or military operation and neglect the problems of health and diseases which may, as they have so often done, actually determine the success or failure of a battle.

This volume, the second of a two-volume set, is part of the story of the Canadian Medical Services in World War II. The first volume concerns itself with administrative matters, the second, here reviewed, is on clinical subjects.

Contributors from the three medical services, land, sea and air, have prepared the text which has been skillfully edited into a unified whole and written in a style which will be intelligible to those outside the medical profession.

The first part of the book is concerned with advances made possible in surgery by the use of antibiotics and new forms of anesthesia. The important effects on morbidity and mortality rates produced by early treatment and prompt evacuation of the sick and wounded and the saving of lives by the use of transfusions of whole blood and blood substitutes are discussed at length.

A considerable portion of the book is devoted to research on problems evoked by new weapons and tactics in warfare. Thus the tremendous increase in airplane speeds and operational heights gave special emphasis to problems of high altitude physiology. The use of unprecedented numbers of armored vehicles and the deployment of men in tropic and arctic climates posed additional problems requiring novel medical, surgical and logistical solutions.

This together with its companion volume is beautifully produced and is a tribute to the men and women of the Canadian Medical Services who contributed so much to the success of the Allied War effort.

MORRIS C. LEIKIND
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A Stillness at Appomattox. By Bruce Catton. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1953. Pp. 438. \$5.00.)

"All up and down the lines men blinked at one another, unable to realize that the hour they had waited for so long was actually at hand. . . . It was Palm Sunday, and they would all live to see Easter, and with the guns quieted it might be easier to comprehend the mystery and the promise of that day. Yet the fact of peace and no more killing and an open road home seems to have been too big to grasp, right at the moment, and in the enormous silence that lay upon the field men remembered that they had marched far and were very tired, and they wondered when the wagon trains would come up with the rations.

". . . Later there would be frenzied cheering and crying and rejoicing, but now . . . now, for some reason, the men sat on the ground and looked across at the Confederate army and found themselves feeling as they never dreamed that the moment of victory would make them feel." (pp. 379-80)

So concludes Bruce Catton in the moving sentences which explain the title of *A Stillness at Appomattox*, the last volume in his trilogy on the Civil War.¹ In this volume the reader is taken with the Army of the Potomac as it set out across the Rapidan River in the spring of 1864 under both its commander, Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, and the new General-in-Chief of all the Union armies, Ulysses Simpson Grant, for whom the rank of lieutenant general had been newly restored by Congress. In this last campaign of the war the Army of the Potomac redeemed itself in the series of fateful battles—The Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, Cold Harbor, the Crater, and Petersburg—which culminated in the evacuation of Richmond and the final surrender at Appomattox.

That a new spirit was infused in the army by the unkempt, bearded little lieutenant general who drove it southward from one bloody encounter to another is evident from Catton's account, but it is also evident that the final victory was won by superior force and logistics in spite of a "subtle weakness" (p. 155), a looseness of command, which was evident in the tardiness with which troops were brought up at critical moments and

in wholly inadequate reconnaissance. "Something," as Catton explains,

"was always going wrong, someone was forever leaving something undone, the loose ends were never quite tied up in time. The experience at Spotsylvania was the classic example. When the big attack on the salient was made no one knew where the enemy was, how the land lay, or what the defenses were like. The man who had to lead the charge was at last forced to ask, in bitter jest, that someone at least point him in the right direction so that he might not miss the Rebel army entirely." (pp. 155-56)

Actually, in the attack on Pickett on the White Oak Road towards the end of the war, three divisions of Warren's V Army Corps went "marching resolutely toward the north," while "the battle was going on somewhere to the west, out of their sight and reach" (p. 353), although one division soon noticed its mistake and managed to wheel into battle.

But part of the trouble was the combination of old-fashioned training and tactics on the one hand and new weapons and a need for new tactics on the other. Specifically, the rifle had come into use and had increased by five-fold the range at which men charging in close-order could be killed and, added to this, was the fact that defending forces had now learned to dig deep trenches and build elaborate earthworks which were all but impregnable.

A Stillness at Appomattox is far from being a volume dealing with strategy and tactics as seen from higher headquarters or a treatise on weapons and fortifications. It is primarily a history of a campaign by one army against a great opponent who was both feared and respected, as seen intimately through the eyes of the Northern soldiers. Thus, it contains horrible pictures of wounded men lying helpless in the burning Wilderness, of deadly hand-to-hand combat at the Bloody Angle, and of the crack of doom at the Crater where victory could have been had but for sheer ineptness of local command. Then there are the pictures of the "news walkers" in the night (pp. 76-7)—the soldiers who after a hard day's fighting would make the rounds of the campfires to get and pass on news and make their own evaluation of the military situation; of the worthless bounty-jumpers; of the wagon trains of wounded streaming into Fredericksburg after The Wilderness and Spotsylvania; and of the stragglers and malingers who mixed with the walking wounded.

¹The other volumes: *Mr. Lincoln's Army* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1951); and *Glory Road: The Bloody Road from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1952).

There is the picture of the army's mighty headquarters at City Point, where "an average day would see 40 steamboats, 75 sailing vessels, and 100 barges tied up or anchored along the waterfront," and where an army hospital "covered 200 acres and could accommodate 10,000 patients . . ." (p. 321). There is the picture of Grant, a fine horseman, galloping along with his staff strung out behind him, "scabbards banging against the sides of lathered horses, the less military officers frantically grabbing hats and saddle leather as they tried to keep up" (p. 37); and of Phil Sheridan galloping up and down in battle and exhorting his troops to do their utmost and more.

There is, one should add, considerable attention given to Sheridan's accomplishments as commander of the Army of the Shenandoah, which ravaged the beautiful valley granary of the Confederacy; as a cavalry leader who viewed cavalry—and under Grant used it—as an important combat arm (as did the rebel Jeb Stuart) and not as simply an escort and guard service; and as an officer who, after rejoining Grant before Petersburg, contributed much to the final surrender of the enemy. Indeed, although Bell I. Wiley thinks of Grant as "the dominant character"² in this book, Catton himself has "observed a little ruefully" that Sheridan "came pretty close to running away with" it.³

In preparing his book, Catton says (p. 382), "chief reliance" was placed upon the *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. But great reliance was also placed upon numerous unit histories, war reminiscences, biographical studies, memoirs, and the like, with some dependence upon general historical works and a few manuscript collections. From these were mined many homely, as well as many perspicacious, observations of the men in the ranks who fought and bled on the road to Appomattox. These materials are usefully arranged in a classified bibliography at the end of the text. The bibliography, in turn, is followed by notes arranged by chapters and numbered by sections. Perhaps these were placed in the back of the book out of deference to the general reader at whom the book is no doubt aimed, but they would be more useful, especially because some of them contain explanatory material, if they were arranged with the text as foot-

notes. The book is equipped with excellent maps which appear as end papers, the frontispiece, and on page 165. Finally, there is a useful index.

Whatever additional materials Bruce Catton might have used in the research phase of writing *A Stillness at Appomattox*, no one can seriously complain about his scholarship; moreover, any complaint that his writing is overdone seems unjustified to this reviewer, who finds it not only an absorbing historical account, but one of substantial literary merit. Its author, a military historian of distinction and a respected liberal journalist (a rare combination!), well deserved both the 1954 National Book Award for non-fiction and the Pulitzer Prize.

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Fourteen Hundred and 91 days in the Confederate Army, or Camp Life; Day-by-Day, of the W. P. Lane Rangers. By William W. Heartsill, with introduction and editing by Bell Irvin Wiley. (Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1954. Pp. 374. \$6.00.) Edition limited to 1000 copies.

The same team of Dr. Bell I. Wiley and the McCowat-Mercer Press that brought us a reprint of Sam R. Watkins' "Co. Aytch, . . ." in 1952 has again combined to produce a reprint of a rare Confederate classic.

Originally written during the War, Heartsill printed the original edition himself, page by page, between 1874 and 1876, on a small hand printing press. Today, only some thirteen copies of the original edition are in existence.

The journal itself presents in detail the day-by-day life of a Confederate soldier, imbued with pride in his unit and confidence in the ultimate success of the Confederate Army. Of particular interest are his accounts of imprisonment after the capture of Arkansas Post and of his service for five months under General Braxton Bragg in the Army of Tennessee climaxed by the battle of Chickamauga. While the W. P. Lane Rangers were not exposed to as much combat experience as many other army units, notably those of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee, nevertheless Heartsill's journal gives full details of Army life as he lived it and is replete with details of all phases of the life of an enlisted man.

This reprint is made by photographic reproduction, preserving the text unedited and conveying much of the flavor of an original edition. The editor concedes that a complete resetting of the

²Bell I. Wiley, "A New Chief, a New Spirit" [a review article], *The New York Times Book Review*, Nov. 29, 1953, p. 3.

³Lewis Nichols, "Talk with Bruce Catton," *The New York Times Book Review*, Nov. 29, 1953, p. 36.

type would be more attractive looking and make for easier reading, but strengthens his position by declaring that better paper and a clearer black and white contrast make the reprint more legible than the original.

This may be so, but the photographic reproduction perpetuates the virtual absence of paragraphing and reproduces the pages in solid blocks of text in fine print that are difficult to read. Could the reproduction have been made successfully with a larger type face? Or was it necessary to reduce the text to the minimum legible size in order to produce clarity? This reviewer feels that the utility of the volume is seriously handicapped by the size of reproduction adopted.

As usual, Dr. Wiley has written an interesting and analytical introduction. The text is followed by a detailed index of twenty pages which is most helpful in view of the unbroken continuity of the narrative.

All in all, Dr. Wiley and the McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc. have performed a real service to the numerous readers and students of Confederate history today in making this outstanding journal again available at a modest cost.

RALPH W. DONNELLY
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International Relations. By Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony. 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954. Pp. 826. \$6.50.)

The authors' approach is much the same as in the first edition, also a volume in the McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science, although this edition has been largely rewritten. Foregoing the temptation to offer an easy solution to problems in International Relations, the authors attempt to provide a strong grounding in the historical past and thus create a firm foundation for future building and action.

The new edition appears to have been subjected to much study and research in consequence of which there has been a general reorganization and re-arrangement of sections and chapters. Considerable new material has been added in the subject fields of: technology, war, law, economics, ethics and tensions. Strong emphasis is placed on techniques and methods in international relations, and many aspects of policy planning are touched upon.

While there are still some weaknesses, as is inevitable in a volume of this size, this second edition is a much better book than the first edition. The authors have contributed an outstanding text

to a complicated field of study.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
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Kick the Dead Lion, A Casebook of the Custer Battle. First Edition by Charles D. DuBois. Printed by The Reporter Printing and Supply Co., Billings, Montana. Paper bound, maps inside covers, 48 pp. incl. app., 6 illust. 7th Cav. cover design, appendix (biblio. notes). Available from Custer Battlefield National Monument, Crow Agency, Montana. \$1.05 postpaid.

Much of the material for this pamphlet is from the library of Major Edward S. Luce, author of *Keogh, Comanche and Custer* and present Superintendent of the Custer Battlefield National Monument. Illustrations are mainly previously published Barry photographs from the files of the Custer Battlefield National Monument.

The pamphlet is concerned with the actions of Major Reno and Captain Benteen in the hours leading up to and their participation in, the Little Big Horn Fight. DuBois characterizes Lt. Colonel George A. Custer as a national hero, something of a departure from the writings of the past two decades, and he endeavors to convince the reader that Custer was killed in the Little Big Horn Fight because of the lack of support of Reno and Benteen. He declaims other present day writers on the fight as being bitter critics of Colonel Custer and presenting "one sided contributions" to the picture of the fight. The author writes in a clear, interesting, easy-to-read style and has conducted considerable research to support his opinions. Some mistakes are apparent such as his discussion of casualties (p. 17) at the beginning of the Reno phase of the fight.

Mr. DuBois lends considerable credence to the allegation that Reno had an intention at one time during the fight of evacuating his hill position and abandoning the wounded. There are references in previous writings to support this conclusion. General Godfrey hinted of this in his *Custer's Last Battle* published in the Century Magazine in January 1892 and at least two other officers have made reference to it but all refer to Captain Benteen as their source of information (See Graham's *The Custer Myth*, 1953). There is no other proof than Benteen's dubious and bitter word on the subject.

KENNETH M. HAMMER
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Soldiers of the American Army, 1775-1954.

Drawings by Fritz Kredel, text by Frederick P. Todd. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. Pp. 144, \$12.50.)

This book, a new, enlarged and largely rewritten edition of a work with a similar title published in 1941, comes forth in 1954 to delight the eye and inform the mind. This time there are 32 excellently colored and well drawn plates, the work of that incomparable illustrator, Fritz Kredel, each with its facing page of descriptive text, written by Frederick P. Todd. The earlier edition had 25 plates, including its unnumbered frontispiece, General George Washington, mounted, with hat raised. In the 1954 edition, General Washington figures as Plate 1 with an accompanying descriptive page, a quote from his "Farewell Orders to the Armies of the United States."

The new edition has a better page arrangement than did its predecessor. In the earlier edition, both descriptive page and color plate were printed on right hand pages, making it necessary to turn the page to compare descriptive details of text and picture. In the 1954 version, description and illustration face each other, with the latter on the right hand page and unbacked, making it available for framing. Colonel Todd, an experienced historian, has annotated his descriptions, giving sources.

Both authors are known to members of the American Military Institute and its companion organization, the Company of Military Collectors and Historians. Frederick P. Todd, one of the founders of the Company of Military Collectors and Historians, and a Trustee of the American Military Institute, is by experience and personal interest, superbly equipped to write up the lore of American military uniforms and equipment. After service as an Associate Archivist with the National Archives, Colonel Todd served in the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Army, whence he accepted his present appointment as Director of the West Point Museum at the U. S. Military Academy. This revised and enhanced edition reflects the fruits of his post WW II research.

Obviously in 32 plates the authors could not record every change and type of uniform in the 179-year spread of their book: they had to eliminate and to select. By and large their selections have been excellent; the faces depicted show life, albeit some would make better cut-throats than gentlemen, and dare we cite in the former category the

two colorful Dragoons of 1851? The color work is excellent and the little details shown in some of the plates add much to their interest. Comparing the periods covered in the two editions, we find that both devote four illustrations to the Revolutionary War, including General Washington; two to the War of 1812; for the Mexican War the 1954 edition added a plate, making three. Devotees of the Civil War period will delight in the new edition, which allots seven plates to four in the 1941 edition.

WW I is cut to one plate over two in the earlier tome: one male in both; one female—phone operator and nurse—in the 1941 volume only. In defense of the few plates covering war periods from 1898 to 1950, be it noted that in general there has been little differentiation in uniforms between the combatant arms since the adoption of khaki or cotton and woolen olive drab uniforms. Bright colors went out with the need for camouflage and invisibility.

We regret that there is no plate illustrating the full dress blues of the Spanish-American War era, with their spiked dark blue helmets for the enlisted man and company or troop officers and the plumed helmet for field officers, the plume of the color of his arm: artillery, red; infantry, white; and cavalry, yellow. The helmet depicted in the 7th Cavalry of 1876 is not the same as that in use in 1898. Perhaps this is a bit of nostalgia from memories of the 9th U. S. Infantry at full dress parade. Certainly that uniform represented a close approach to some of the European armies of that day.

Another plate for which we yearn would be one depicting some of the non-commissioned Staff of the pre WW I era or the period between the two World Wars, with their sleeve insignia and some of their equipment, such as a master gunner, C.A.C., with transit and plane table, or a master signal electrician. But then, what one person wants, another abhors.

Kredel and Todd have presented some very interesting material. Properly, they have devoted their major efforts to the combat soldier, excepting, of course, the WAC. Glad are we to see the last plate devoted to those builders of morale and esprit—the bandsmen. In closing, let no one assume that because Plate 31 fails to depict a brunette WAC that there are none such.

WM. COOPER FOOTE
Colonel, USA, Ret.
Washington, D. C.

From the Danube to the Yalu. By General Mark W. Clark, USA (Ret.), New York, Harper and Bros., 1954. Pp. 369. \$5.00.

Here is a book that should be read by every American citizen who wishes to be well informed on the subject of dealing with the Communists. Speaking as a private citizen, General Clark paints a vivid picture of his running battles against Communists and Communist activities since 1945. The reader will make first-hand acquaintance of Soviet representatives at the conference table, the battle front, and in the prison camp. The seven years' experience of one of America's foremost military figures is told in blunt, simple and most readable language for anyone to read.

Beginning with his early experience in negotiating with the Russians while High Commissioner for Austria, the author weaves a fascinating account of the first two years of the cold war, the Kojima Island Mutiny, the Armistice in Korea, "Little Switch" and the "Big Picture" of the Korean War. His comments on such subjects as the task in Japan, the manpower and ammunition shortage and the war on the propaganda front make a valuable addition to the volumes of facts and opinions already expressed. General Clark's concluding chapter, "The Over-All Picture in Asia," is well worth the price of the book.

No matter what the reader's personal views may be on the controversial questions of the prosecution and outcome of the Korean War; the Asia problem and Communism in general, Mark Clark's book makes interesting and worthwhile reading and he deserves his chance to express his views in accordance with the American tradition. That he does not agree with the over-all policies in Korea become apparent early in the book and the reader has no doubts as to the policy Clark would have pursued. Cast against the background of a lifetime of military service on behalf of the United States and a warrior's pride in the might and right of his country, General Clark freely speaks his mind. That the book is controversial need not be emphasized. It should be remembered, however, that here the reader will find an eye witness account and an opinion based on experience and ability in political-military analysis.

The Korean War is too recent for history to blame or praise and books written at this date on the subject are inclined to mix emotion with fact. No doubt this has played a part in General Clark's very fine offering. Nevertheless, *From the*

Danube to the Yalu is part of the evidence in the case and expert testimony is always admissible in any trial. Whether his opinions and deductions are right or wrong cannot be decided in our time; that is the business of future generations of historians. Meanwhile, General Clark's book merits the careful reading due any volume as well written and interesting as this one.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
Lt. Col., USAF
Washington, D. C.

Lord Nelson. By Carola Oman. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954. Pp. 158. \$1.75.)

This volume is the latest in the commendable "Brief Lives" Series, which has to date included works on such military and naval figures as Sir Francis Drake, Montrose, and Rupert of the Rhine; these will shortly be followed by lives of Edward I. and Wellington.

In 1947 Carola Oman, daughter of the late Sir Charles Oman, dean of military historians, saw the publication of her full-length biography of Lord Nelson. In many ways her life of Nelson is superior to the earlier work on the same subject by Mahan, though Mahan's life of the great Admiral will never be supplanted. It was not too difficult for Miss Oman, then, to write this greatly abbreviated version of her earlier book.

For a reader who knows absolutely nothing about Nelson, this book is not recommended; it would only add confusion to ignorance. For the reader who knows a little something about Nelson and about naval warfare in the days before steam, Miss Oman's book should prove enlightening as well as entertaining, and a useful outline for more extensive studies.

Lord Nelson is vividly written, and has an excellent account of that near disaster, the attack on Calvi in Corsica in 1794, where the future victor of Trafalgar was wounded in the right eye. This of course led to the famous incident at the Battle of Copenhagen, when Nelson, after being ordered by signal to leave off action, raised his glass to his right eye and said: "I really do not see the signal."

A Chronological Table and a Note on Sources somewhat compensate for the absence of an index.

ROBERT WALKER DAVIS
Washington, D. C.

Confederate Agent: A Discovery in History.

By James D. Horan. (new York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1954. Pp. xxvi (326. \$5.00.)

Here we have a modern reinterpretation of the Confederate activities behind the Federal lines with the flavor of a detective novel. Yet the author has relied upon historical facts and accredited sources for his information which he has skillfully welded into his narrative. He has added twelve pages of notes concerning the major sources used, chapter by chapter, as well as a ten page bibliography.

The story of the Confederate agents in the North is not new, and that part of the title which proclaims the book to be "A Discovery in History" should be discounted, but Mr. Horan is entitled to much credit for a synthesis of hitherto unconnected narratives and facts as well as credit for original research which has filled in gaps in our previous knowledge.

The author revolves his story around the central character of Captain Thomas H. Hines (T. Henry Hines in the index to the *Official Records* . . .) and one wonders if perchance he does not over-emphasize Hines' importance in the great Confederate conspiracy and minimizes the rôle of the other leaders. Close research on Hines' life has undoubtedly made Mr. Horan feel very close and sympathetic to him with a feeling akin to hero worship, and this is reflected in the writing. The author does, however, give the Federals credit for clever counter-espionage work, and his admiration, fairly earned, is liberally bestowed upon Felix Stidger.

Various reproductions of documents are introduced and add to the interest of the reader. The reviewer was particularly interested in the Confederate decoding machines pictured on page 74. Some sixteen of these "metallic cypher readers" were made by Francis LaBarre, a refugee from Washington, D. C., and one-time private in Co. H, 7th Virginia Infantry, on plans made by Captain William N. Barker, C. S. Signal Corps, and also a Washington refugee. He was paid \$10 for each of these machines on April 11, 1863, according to the original receipt on file in the U. S. National Archives.

Students of the Civil War will find this book an interesting and informative addition to their library.

RALPH W. DONNELLY
Civil War Round Table of
Washington, D. C.

Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy

Chief. By Joseph T. Durkin, S.J. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1954. Pp. 456, Bibliography, Index. \$6.00.

This first published biography of the Confederate Secretary of the Navy is the result of careful scholarship and painstaking research. It illuminates the naval problems of the Confederacy in an objective, realistic, and well-balanced narrative. It was written with the encouragement of the late Douglas Southall Freeman, and it met with his approval. It is well written, has a comprehensive bibliography, and good index.

Mallory's mother was born in Ireland, his father in Connecticut. Fatherless at 15, Mallory had little formal schooling, but became a great reader. He studied law in Key West, Florida, where maritime matters were predominant. Entering the U.S. Senate, in 1851, he became Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee and applied himself to the study of naval problems and the country's maritime needs. When Florida seceded he was appointed Secretary of the Navy, and became the only Cabinet member to serve throughout the life of the Confederacy. He performed no miracles, but was an excellent administrator and probably accomplished as much as was possible.

Mallory was a man of fine character. He was unusually frank in his speeches and in all his official business. The author presents contemporary praise and blame in an impartial manner.

As it should, this book considers the naval problems of the Confederacy from the viewpoint of Richmond and gives an understandable account of Mallory's work. Mallory seems to have possessed a realistic understanding of what was possible, and a temperament which caused him to overcome obstacles and persevere in the face of repeated discouragements. He had to contend with civil officials and army officers who looked upon naval vessels as floating artillery for local defense. Apparently he was carried away by unreasoning enthusiasm only once,—in his message to Captain Buchanan of the *Virginia*, March 7, 1862, just before her fights in Hampton Roads. To visualize the *Virginia*, single-handed, attacking and burning the city of New York was indeed "naive," as the author says.

JOHN B. HEFFERNAN
Rear Admiral USN (Rtd)

Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath. By Harry Emerson Wildes. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. Pp. 356. \$4.50.)

Here is one of the best books written to date about the American occupation of Japan. An on-the-spot review of the ambitious attempt to remodel an entire nation through the medium of military occupation, *Typhoon in Tokyo* is crammed full of facts and thoughtful interpretations.

The author, Harry Emerson Wildes, is particularly qualified to write such a volume. He visited and studied Japan before the war, served for five years as a member of the Occupation, and then remained for an additional two years after the signing of the peace treaty in 1951. He was thus in an excellent position to study and evaluate the Occupation and its effects on the country and the people. His book is based on personal observations, interviews, published works, and official sources.

Dr. Wildes has examined post-war Japan and its American rulers in great detail. Exhibiting a broad familiarity with Japanese customs, politics, and key individuals, he also demonstrates a thorough understanding of the workings of the Occupation and of the men who ran it. His style is pleasant and highly readable, but at the same time critical and objective. What he has to say is of interest to both the general reader, seeking a broad picture, and the specialist, who needs facts and figures.

In the author's opinion, the Occupation did well despite itself. Where its leaders erred most was in making unwarranted claims of success and refusing to acknowledge, even to themselves, that such claims were premature or patently absurd. In spite of this attitude, a startling amount of ineptness, and an almost constant struggle between MacArthur's staff sections, the Occupation

brought "important changes" to Japan and accomplished much.

The result was not the "revolution" claimed by many, but what Wildes terms "a highly successful Renaissance." This he compares, in its ultimate effect on Japan, to the Meiji Restoration, which ended feudalism in that country and established a modern government. The author gives credit for this "Renaissance" not to General MacArthur and those around him, but to "the devoted middle brass" and "an amazingly cooperative Japanese populace."

Perhaps the best chapters in the book are those dealing with post-war Japanese politics, with the historic and present role of the Emperor, and with the widely-publicized "purge" of undesirable elements from Japanese public life. The military historian will be especially interested in the description of "the Great MacArthur History" and the monumental effort involved to produce it.

The author has much to say about the role of "leftists" within the Occupation, but his observations might have been more valuable had he bothered to define this term. Moreover, while there is no doubt that many Americans failed to assess properly the dangers of Communism in Japan, in most cases Dr. Wildes' strong implication that these people knowingly "paralleled the Communist line" remains to be proven.

Typhoon in Tokyo would be more convincing to the general reader and more useful to the scholar had its author utilized a better system of documentation than the loose collection of "sources" printed at the end of the book. Also, in a volume as comprehensive as this one, it is both surprising and disappointing to find no discussion of War Crimes trials and the Japanese reaction to them. These omissions, however, do not detract from the general excellence of the presentation.

STANLEY L. FALK
American University
Washington, D. C.

SHORTER REVIEWS

The following books are among those received for review by MILITARY AFFAIRS. Space has not allowed a more detailed discussion of their value to our readers. The cooperation of their publishers is called to the attention of all those interested in this field.

GIBBS-SMITH, C. H.: *Aircraft Recognition Manual* (new ed.). (London: Putnam; New York: John de Graff, Inc., 1954. Pp. 239. \$2.50.)

This pocket sized manual contains world aircraft arranged by size and speed, giving an indexed text description, outline of shape and clear photographs of each plane described. Recommended since a good balance has been achieved in providing available information needed in small compass.

GREAT BRITAIN, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION: *Britain's Defense Effort*. (New York:

British Information Services, 1954. Pp. 35.

A valuable brief description of her military responsibilities, their impact on the economy and how met.

HARRIS, GEORGE W.: *Sut Lovingood*, edited with an introduction by Brom Weber. (New York: The Grove Press, 1954. Pp. 262. \$4.00.)

A volume of stories of an American humorist who died in 1869 and which includes three satires written in 1861 concerning President Lincoln.

HILGER, GUSTAV, AND MEYER, ALFRED G.: *The Incompatible Allies, German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941*. (New York: Macmillan, 1953. Pp. 350. \$5.00.)

During this entire period Gustav Hilger was in the German embassy in Moscow, being the Second Counselor at the time of the invasion. The volume resulted from the careful collaboration of Mr. Hilger with Dr. Meyer at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University with the result that the book is both a personal memoir of intense interest and also one of the most authoritative accounts of Soviet-German relations available.

HOOPES, THOMAS T.: *Armour and Arms, an elementary handbook and guide to the collection in the City Art Museum of St. Louis, Missouri*. (St. Louis, 1954. Pp. 43. 75¢, 85¢ by mail.)

This is an outstanding artistic description of the collection including 51 illustrations which are clearly seen through the use of coated paper. The text not only describes the collection but does present a good introduction to the subject. It is highly recommended for anyone interested in military history and the museum is to be commended in preparing such a satisfying publication.

KRITOVULOS: *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, tr. from the Greek by Charles T. Riggs. (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1954. Pp. 222. \$5.00.)

Sultan Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, is seen for the first time in English by a contemporary Greek historian who joined his service after the city's fall. The period described is from 1451 to 1467, at which time the author's death prevented its completion. The translator, who died in 1953, was for many years a missionary in the Near East. It is of great value for not only military historians of the period, but also is recommended for those concerned with how the greatest military leaders conducted operations.

MOORE, GUY W.: *The Case of Mrs. Surratt, her controversial trial and execution for conspiracy*

in the Lincoln assassination. (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. Pp. 142. \$3.00.)

This is the latest study of the trial which is based upon a careful search into available sources including Col. J. E. Raymond's manuscript his-Nair." Mr. Moore, in his conclusion, believes Mrs. Surratt was innocent. The volume is of interest to military historians since it discusses the rare military commission but the major impact of the trial was in its effect on public opinion and the resulting treatment of the south. The study is a valuable contribution but it is not the final word on this controversial topic.

The Nation's National Guard. (Washington, D. C.: The National Guard Association of the United States, 1954. Pp. 119.)

Prepared by the Committee on Public Relations of the National Guard Association of the United States, this attractive volume makes generally available in one place the history, constitutional and legislative background of this important segment of American strength. The major portions of the volume are the Army War College addresses of Major General E. C. Erickson, 17 February 1954, and Major General E. A. Walsh, 5 February 1953, and the latter's address to the Adjutants General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 22 February 1954. The last section is composed of a roll call of states by units organized and ready. In addition to this authoritative discussion, the profusion of well chosen illustrations and line drawings enliven the entire work.

STACEY, C. P.: *The Undefended Border, the Myth and the Reality*. (Ottawa; Canadian Historical Association, 1953. Pp. 19. 25¢.)

Colonel Stacey has written a succinct, popular account of Canadian-American relations based upon his own more detailed books and articles.

STACEY, C. P., ed.: *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*, 3rd ed. (Ottawa: Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Queens Printer, 1953. Pp. 128.)

Colonel Stacey, Director of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, has greatly enlarged and revised this manual which first appeared in 1951 (Pp. 39). In the introduction the author points out that "It is not in matters of factual detail, however, that military history makes its main contribution to the education of a soldier. The historical study of military institutions and

campaigns is an admirable method of training and conditioning the mind for the solution of the problems of the present and future."

The volume includes a section on the development of the Canadian Army and selected campaigns and battles from Sir William Phips' Attack on Quebec in 1690 to the Normandy Assault in 1944. The appendices include the "Principles of War," a "Glossary" (of some basic terms commonly used in military history) and a list of "books for further reading." These articles are reprinted from the *Canadian Army Journal* whose pocket sized format encourages browsing reading and subsequent thought. It is altogether a most excellent "Introduction" and is of interest to all military historians.

STANLEY, G. F. C.: *Louis Riel, patriot or rebel*. (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1954. Pp. 25. 25¢.)

The second in this series of historical booklets is by Dr. Stanley, head of the Department of History, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, and is based upon the author's 1936 study as well as the works found in the bibliographic note.

National Program for the Publication of Historical Documents. (A report to the President by the National Historical Publications Commission. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 114, 50¢.)

This most important report reviews past publication activities, proposes a national program listing papers recommended to be published and discusses the commission's part in the program. In opening up this vast field it describes the most important national leaders' papers and the status of their location and the amount already published. It is a "must" report for every American historian both in terms of the proposed program and for its source information.

WALLACE, EDWARD S.: *General William Jenkins Worth, Monterey's forgotten hero*. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953. Pp. 242. \$5.00.)

This careful scholarly biography rescues from obscurity after his death at the age of 55 in 1849, one of the best American generals in our war with Mexico. His quarrel with General Winfield Scott prevented him from receiving his just deserts in our military history and proper perspective is now achievable as found in this excellent biography, much of which is based on previously unknown letters and manuscripts.

U. S. National Archives Preliminary Inventories of especial value to military historians are: No. 48: Records of the Special Committee of the Senate to investigate the National Defense Program, 1941-48. Compiled by H. E. Hufford, assisted by T. L. Prince, 1952. 227 p.

No. 49: Records of the President's Air Policy Commission, compiled by H. T. Ulasek, 1952. 6 p.

No. 50: Central Office Records of the National Resources Planning Board, compiled by V. E. Baugh, 1953. 66 p.

No. 54: Records of the Office of Censorship, compiled by H. T. Ulasek, 1953. 16 p.

No. 55: Administrative Records of the Bureau of Pensions and the Pension Service, compiled by T. M. Boardman, M. R. Trever and L. W. Southwick, 1953. 17 p.

No. 56: Records of the Office of War Information, compiled by H. S. Hilton, 1953. 149 p.

No. 59: Records of Certain Committees of the Senate investigating the disposal of surplus property, 1945-48, compiled by G. P. Perros and T. L. Prince, 1953. 24 p.

No. 60: Records of Selected Foreign Service Posts, compiled by A. P. Mavro, 1953. 51 p.

No. 61: Records of the Special Committee of the Senate to investigate Petroleum resources 1944-46, compiled by G. P. Perros, 1953. 17 p.

No. 62: Records of the Special Committee of the Senate on Atomic Energy, 1945-46, compiled by G. P. Perros, 1953. 8 p.

No. 65: Records of certain committees of the House of Representatives investigating the disposal of surplus property, 1946-48, compiled by G. P. Perros, 1954. 21 p.

No. 67: Records of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives to investigate air accidents, 1941-43, compiled by G. P. Perros, 1954. 13 p.

No. 68: Cartographic records of the American Commission to negotiate peace, compiled by J. B. Rhoads, 1954. 11 p.

No. 70: Records of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Post-War Military Policy, 1944-46, compiled by G. P. Perros, 1954. 6 p.

No. 71: Records of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives investigating national defense migration, 1940-43, compiled by G. P. Perros, 1954. 30 p.

No. 73: Cartographic records of the U. S. Marine Corps, compiled by C. M. Ashby, 1954. 17 p.

No. 74: Records of the Joint Congressional Aviation Policy Board, 1947-48, compiled by W. C. Caudell and G. P. Perros, 1954. 26 p.

Special List No. 13: List of Cartographic records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, compiled by L. E. Kelsay, 1954. 127 p.

National Archives Accessions No. 51: June 1954; contains a study on the Continental Congress papers, their history 1783-1952, by C. L. Lokke and Accessions from July 1, 1952 to June 30, 1953. 1954. 35 p.

List of Microfilm publications, 1953. 98 p.

U. S. COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: *Report to the President and the Congress, January 23, 1954.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 94.)

Minority report, *Ibid*, Pp. 20; staff papers represented to the commission on foreign economic policy, February 1954, Pp. 531.

Headed by Clarence B. Randall these three documents will continue to be fundamental for the student of the economic aspects of our military history and policy.

U. S. PRESIDENT: *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program.* (Washington: GPO, 1952-1954. v.p. The first is as of December 31, 1951, Pp. 81; the second as of June 30, 1952, Pp. 48; the third as of December 31, 1952, Pp. 15; the fourth as of June 30, 1953, Pp. 61; the fifth as of December 31, 1953, Pp. 65 and the latest as of June 30, 1954, Pp. 63. These reports provide a most succinct summary of our world wide economic and military aid to the free world.

THE U. S. ADMINISTRATOR OF MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT has issued four reports to Congress relating to the "program for the denial of strategic goods to the soviet bloc." (Washington: GPO, 1952-1954: 1st, 1952, Pp. 107; 2nd "Problems of Economic Defense," 1953, Pp. 89; 3rd, 1st half of 1953, "World Wide Enforcement of Strategic Trade Controls," 1953. Pp. 96; 4th, second half 1953, "East-West Trade Trends," 1954, Pp. 102. These provide most valuable information on U. S. economic warfare efforts.

U. S. 83rd Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions:

Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels Economies held hearings during 1953 and 1954 on Stockpile and accessibility of strategic and

critical materials to the United States in time of War:

Part 1. U. S. Department of Interior: Bureau of Mines, 1953. Pp. 351.

2. GSA, ODM, Dept. of Defense and Tactical Military Experts, 1954. Pp. 825.

3. Titanium, 1954. Pp. 791.

4. International materials conference, 1954. Pp. 1181.

5. Commodity trade agreements, 1954. Pp. 447.

6. Petroleum, Gas and Coal, 1954. Pp. 1340.

7. Tariff and Taxes and their Relationship to Critical materials, 1954. Pp. 320.

8. Staff Study of the Paley Commission Report, 1954. Pp. 783.

9. Uranium, Columbian Cobalt and Butile Miscellaneous Strategic raw materials of Agricultural Origin, 1954. Pp. 490.

10. Industrial Representatives of Producers and users of strategic and critical materials, 1954, Vol. 10 and appendix, vol., 1954. Pp. 1641.

Senator Malone was chairman of the Committee and the hearings are summarized in the Committee's report: 83rd Congress, second session, Senate Report #1627. Washington, GPO, 1954. Pp. 415.

U. S. 83RD CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION: House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1954, Washington GPO, 1954. Pp. 1326. Presents most detailed information in its testimony.

US 83rd Congress, 2nd session: House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Hearings before the Special sub-committee to consider operations of military sea transportation Service. (Washington: GPO, 1954. 2 parts. Pp. 680.

Report submitted by Mr. Allen, its chairman, Washington GPO, 1954. Pp. 28 (House report #2672.)

U. S. Department of State Publications issued in 1954 include:

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' speeches made during 1954: Our Policy for Germany, January 25. Spirit of Inter-American Unity, March 4. Intervention, the Story of International Communism in the Americas, March 8. Policy for Security and Peace, March 16.

The threat of Red Asia, March 29. Toward a free Korea, April 28. The issues at Geneva, May 7. The challenge to freedom, May 15. Foreign policy aspects of the atomic energy act, June 3—Hearings. Free World Unity,

June 4—Hearings. Harry N. Howard: The development of U.S. policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa during 1953. Background "Italy"—1954 Intervention of international communism in Guatemala, August, Pp. 96.

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#LEVERKUEHN, PAUL: *German Military Intelligence*; tr. from the German by R. H. Stevens and Constantine Fitzgibbon. (New York: Praeger, 1954. Pp. 216. \$3.50.)

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OWEN, FRANK: *The Eddie Chapman Story*. (New York: Messner, 1954. Pp. 250. \$3.50.) British safecracker and undercover agent during the war.

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#RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, LORD: *The Scourge of*

the Swastika; a short history of Nazi war crimes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 271. \$4.50.)

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE IN NEW YORK

On December 29, 1954, the annual joint session of the American Military Institute with the American Historical Association was held at the Commodore Hotel in New York City. Under the chairmanship of Dr. Stefan T. Possony, a trustee of the Institute and a member of the editorial staff of *Military Affairs*, Herbert S. Dinerstein and Raymond L. Garthoff, of the Rand Corporation, read papers on, respectively, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene, 1933 to 1940" and "Soviet Attitudes to Modern Air Power"; and Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, of the Air University, a new trustee of the Institute, dealt with "The Impact of Air Power on the Second World War and the Cold War to the Korean Armistice." This program, "The Role of Air Power in Recent History," which was arranged by Dr. Possony, brought so many persons to the meeting that there was standing room only. The papers evoked questions, notably from Col. T. N. Dupuy of Harvard and Professor Emerson of Yale, and some discussion. Mr. Garthoff's thesis, also set forth in his recent book, *Soviet Military Doctrine*,* that the Soviet Union, heretofore conceiving of air power primarily as a means of ground support, stands today in its air theory about where the United States stood a decade ago, received attention in *The New York Times* in the December 30 issue.

There was interest in the free copies of *Military Affairs* and in the membership applications displayed by Col. William Cooper Foote, the Institute's secretary, who was on hand with a bulging briefcase and a big smile for everyone.

A number of friends and members of the Institute met for cocktails in the late afternoon following the meeting. Among those seen at the morning session or over cocktails, and not yet mentioned, were Rear Adm. John D. Hayes, president of the Institute, and his predecessor in that position, Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong; Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett, a trustee, and Stetson Conn, both of the Army's Office of Military History; Col. Frederick P. Todd, a trustee and one of the founders of the Institute, now director of the West Point Museum; Col. R. E. Dupuy, known for his writings on West Point and the father of Harvard's Col. Dupuy; Lt. Col. Francis O. Hough, a trustee, and Rowland P. Gill, assistant secretary of the Institute, both Marine Corps historians and members of the editorial staff of *Military Affairs*; Albert F. Simpson, the Air Forces' chief historian and his deputy, Joe Angell; John K. Mahon, who was up from the University of Florida, where he is now on the history faculty; Jonathan Grossman and Lt. Walter Rundell, Jr., historians in the Office of the Chief of Finance; Leo P. Brophy, acting chief historian in the Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, and his assistant, Dale Birdsell (with Mrs. Birdsell, also a historian); Don Mitchell, known for his writings on naval history but now with the Historical Unit of the Army Medical Corps; and your reporter, who apologizes for his inability to list all who were present.**

*Reviewed by Lt. Col. Brooke Nihart in *Military Affairs*, XVIII (spring 1954), 33-35.

**Candor requires mention of the fact that Editor Gondos was not at the New York meetings because of a previous engagement with Florida's sunshine. (Editorial Note: So says Paul J. Scheips, the scrivener of this piece).

The 1954 sessions in New York City, both professional and social, were among the most successful in recent years.

AMI WINTER LUNCHEON

The winter season luncheon meeting of the American Military Institute occurred on 8 February 1955, in the Ebony Room of the Naval Gun Factory Officers Club, Washington, D. C. The success of these meetings has become proverbial. There was a record attendance of 83 persons interested in military history. Colonel Foote, our eminent Institute Secretary, had a difficult time finding places for a party of Peruvian officers, accompanied by Army, Navy, and Air attaches, who arrived just as the luncheon was starting. Amongst those attending was the Archivist of the United States, Dr. Wayne C. Grover, whose interest in the work of the Institute is of long standing. President Hayes introduced a number of the many distinguished lunchoneers present and, in his usual happy vein, he took an unpremeditated poke at the ladies with his declaration that "writing military history is a *man's* job." Unhappily, the salvo of ironic laughter, mainly emanating from the capable female historians present, underscored the inadvertence. Hastily tacking into the wind, the Admiral amended this to "a man-sized job wick, nevertheless," he concluded, "the ladies do very competently indeed, and we cordially welcome them to the fold." The address of the day was given by Colonel Crystal of the Air Force, who rendered an interesting if brief comparative analysis of the power concepts of "Machiavelli, MacKinder, and Mahan." Colonel Crystal's talk, despite the forbiddingly difficult range indicated by its title, was delivered in a sprightly fashion and very well received by the audience. Certain other gustatorily inclined gentlemen, though present, are not mentioned as their expressed desire for incognito is respected. It was a splendid gathering.

JOINT AMI-AFHF MEETING PROPOSED

Within recent months correspondence developed between the American Military Institute and The Air Force Historical Foundation relating to the possibility of holding a joint meeting of the two organizations, probably at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The promoters of the meeting, Admiral John D. Hayes of the Institute, and Dr. Eugene Emme and General Hume Peabody of the Foundation, are continuing to work on this project. The AFHF is intending to follow the example of the Naval Historical Foundation in acting as a central depository for the permanent professional papers or personal archives of Air Force Officers. AFHF is also pushing the latest development of historiography, so-called "oral history," and the pioneer experiences of famous early flyers, such as General Carl Spaatz and General Benjamin Foulois, have been tape recorded. The NHF's Document Collection, incidentally, is on permanent loan to the Library of Congress, and it is possible the AFHF may also follow this example in the handling of personal archives.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GETS COLLECTION OF BRADY NEGATIVES

The largest collection of Matthew B. Brady negatives was recently acquired by the Library of Congress. The collection also includes the work of Brady's nephew, L. C. Handy, and together the labors of the two men cover the photographic remains of a century of the national capital's history, particularly its principal celebrities. Some 3,000 negatives were made by Brady, some as early as 1840; and there are several thousand Handy plates, some dating to 1932, the year he died. The collection has been kept in the Handy home at 594 Maryland Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C., ever since Mr. Handy inherited the contents of Brady's studio when the latter died in 1896. Mrs. Mary H. Evans and Mrs. Alice

H. Cox, daughters of Mr. Handy, continued to operate the studio making prints from the famous negatives, until the collection was transferred to the Library.

BRITISH NAVY SECOND ONLY TO USN

For some time now there has been a disquieting tendency in the stream of news items to portray the Russian fleet as having shouldered Britain out of second place as a naval power. In a recent report our British information sources assure us that the Royal Navy is still second only to the United States Navy. Although no battleships, aircraft carriers, or cruisers have been ordered by Britain since the end of the war, nevertheless the Royal Navy has been engaged on a huge program of warship conversion and modernization. The news items are erroneous in comparing the total Russian figures against that of the British active service ships only. But Her Majesty's Navy has an immense reserve fleet which, when manned, would be much stronger than the Russian. Nor is this Reserve Fleet obsolete. Nothing could be further from the truth. There are some 500 major units in it, including half a dozen battleships, 67 destroyers, and over 200 frigates and mine sweepers. Most of the Reserve Fleet's units are maintained in a high state of readiness, and many of the ships are brand new.

Britain has been cautious, however, about building new large ships, such as aircraft carriers, because the major navies of the world are on the verge of great changes. The development of atomic propulsion for ships, ship specialization, and guided missiles will have a profound effect on naval strategy and tactics of the future. The British therefore wonder whether big ships, as we now know them, will have a place in the navy of the future. It is possible that fleets will consist mainly of small ships, none larger than

cruisers and light aircraft carriers. The British Admiralty is keeping an open mind on the subject. Therefore for the next few years Britain will follow a policy of "wait and see," but meanwhile doing a great deal of small ship building and conversion to strengthen its anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, mine sweeping, and coastal forces.

REMOTE CONTROL PHYSICAL CHECK-UP FOR AVIATORS

The Navy has come up with a "telemetering" device which allows a physician on the ground to conduct physical examinations of pilots flying in an airplane. This telemetering device was developed at the Naval Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, and the Institute reports results of recent tests, as follows:

A Navy doctor sitting in a Los Angeles hotel room was able to tell how two pilots flying at 6,000 feet over the city were functioning. The pilots were electronically 'examined' by means of tiny silver electrodes taped to various parts of their bodies that transmitted their reactions—via an amplifier and an ultra-high frequency radio—to a bank of instruments below. With the telemetering system it's said that scientists can determine heart performance, respiration, skin and body temperature, pulse rate and brain wave activity.

NECROLOGY

COLONEL CHARLES HILLMAN FRANKLIN
A military historian well-known in Army historical circles in Washington, D.C., Colonel Charles Hillman Franklin, died in Nashville, Tennessee, 23 November 1954, at the age of 68. Colonel Franklin was Chief of the Precedent and History Section of The Adjutant General's Office, during and after World War II, until he retired in 1950. He served in the Tennessee National Guard for

10 years and in the Regular Army for 33 years. During World War I, Colonel Franklin, then a chief clerk in the AEF, served as secretary to the then Colonel (later General) George C. Marshall. Between wars he served as a historian at the Army War College, where he was the author of a number of original studies, including his favorite History of the Philippine Constabulary. Colonel Franklin was a very likable man, ever willing to be helpful to puzzled searchers trying to pursue a clue in the historical vineyards. The American Military Institute salutes a departed friend and ally.

COLONEL W. A. GRAHAM*

No one episode in U. S. History, considering its size and overall importance, has created, relatively, as much interest and controversy as the campaign of the Little Big Horn, which resulted in the destruction of five troops of the U. S. 7th. Cavalry and Indian Scouts and civilians, led by Lt. Col. George A. Custer, on June 25-26, 1876.

Uncounted authors have based their narratives, novels and histories on the incidents of the campaign, many of them clearly biased. In this cloud of conflicting views and partisanship, more than thirty years ago Colonel W. A. Graham, realizing the importance of an objective history, began interviewing and corresponding with survivors, collecting data, studying all phases of the campaign, and as a trained lawyer evaluated the evidence on a strictly impartial basis.

The first edition of his *The Story of the Little Big Horn*, the most objective of all histories of the campaign, appeared in 1926, and shortly thereafter the main text was reprinted, practically in full, in the *U. S. Cavalry Journal*. During the succeeding years Colonel Graham continued his interest and research, publishing several slightly revised editions, the latest in 1952, and in 1953 *The Custer*

Myth, a compilation of reports, outstanding articles, Indian statements, etc., with his neutral comments. More recently he published the complete proceedings of the Reno court-martial, and later a condensed version thereof.

Colonel Graham was born in Illinois 23 Jan. 1875 and graduated from the State University of Iowa Law School in 1897. He was commissioned in the Iowa National Guard 20 May 1912, and served on the Mexican Border in 1916-17, as Captain Co. B 3rd. Iowa Inf. During WWI he was on active duty as a Major, JAG Sec. ORC, commissioned Lt. Col. JA US Army 25 Feb. '19 and Colonel 1 June '31.

He was an Honorary Member of The Order of Indian Wars of the United States, prior to its merger with the American Military Institute, and an Hereditary Member of the Order of the Carabao.

Upon retirement he settled at Pacific Palisades, California, where he continued his literary labors with the loyal assistance of Mrs. Graham, to whom he pays a delightful tribute in the "Acknowledgments" to his *The Custer Myth*.

He died suddenly 8 Oct. 1954 at the Naval Hospital, Corona, California, and was buried in Arlington Cemetery 15 October, at the height of hurricane "Hazel."

Besides Mrs. Graham he leaves two sons, Colonel Alexander Graham, USA and W. A. Graham, Jr., a midshipman at Annapolis.

In the passing of Colonel Graham, an officer and gentleman, the nation has lost an outstanding authority on Custeriana, whose sole purpose as an historian was to be accurate and objective, in which he admirably succeeded.

The Officers and Editors of the American Military Institute extend their sincere sympathy to the bereaved family and those of us who knew Colonel Graham add a word of personal sorrow.

*Contributed by Lt. Col. H. S. Merrick, The Order of Indian Wars of the U.S.

EDITORIAL



THE MILITARY OFFICER AND HIS HISTORY

WHY is the U. S. Military profession today unable to produce writers?

Why are there no successors to Upton, Dodge and Spaulding, or to Luce, Mahan, Fiske and Knox? The interpretative military writing in English now comes from abroad, in the works of Fuller and Liddell Hart and of others such as Admiral Richmond, Captain Grenfell and Air Marshall Slessor. The British military profession publishes *Brassey's Annual—The Armed Forces Year Book* and the quarterly *Journal* of the Royal United Services Institution. Nothing comparable is produced in the United States. The American military profession, now at its peak and holding the destiny of the world in its hands is unable to know itself except through foreign pens.

Why is this? It cannot be because of lack of stress on military education. American military officers spend more time in schools than do their counterparts anywhere in the world. But little creative thought from these schools have reached book form. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his great work on sea power while the Naval War College was going through its first difficult years. Warfare has now taken new forms but the necessary interpretation has not come from the joint colleges established since World War II. Security cannot be the reason entirely.

The cause for this condition may lie in a warning given over half a century ago by Captain Henry C. Taylor. Taylor was Mahan's successor at the Naval War College and one of the group of forward-looking officers, now almost forgotten, who prepared the Navy for its great test of World War II. His report on the College in 1897 contained the following paragraph:

It is noticed that the interest excited by the [war game] exercises . . . leads some officers to neglect the reading of history. This is a tendency that should be carefully guarded against for the basis of all true knowledge of the art of war is to be found in the intelligent study of history.

Despite several wars and a rise to world leadership, this neglect is still evident, in fact it is now more than neglect. The impact of physical science on warfare has caused officers to disregard or avoid history for fear that it may misguide. Modern man's stress on the natural sciences has caused faith to be put in things rather than in people,—and history can only help in understanding people. In modern warfare, it is weapons that seem to count, not warriors,—and military history cannot improve weapons, it can only improve the warrior's trade and his use of weapons.

War is a human activity and its study is a social science. The only true laboratory for a social science, for analysing the affairs of men, is history. "The Past is half of Time, the tested half," said Herman Melville.

Every profession needs a proper balance of thinkers and doers, of researchers and practitioners, of philosophers and men of action. Today the United States is in need of military philosophers. Admiral Stephen B. Luce, probably the most learned man that the U. S. military profession has produced, was fond of the expression, "History is philosophy teaching by examples." Today Americans are pleading for a philosophy of war consistent with their philosophy of life and of government. The military profession will never be able to define such a philosophy unless officers take time to read history and some devote themselves to its study.

J. D. H.

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